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2.1 Introduction 
The ability of the major developing countries of the Asian Pacific 
rim (APR)-Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea (henceforth referred 
to as Korea), the Republic of China (henceforth referred to as Taiwan), 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Peo- 
ples's Republic of China (henceforth referred to as China)-to compete 
in the markets of the United States is well known and frequently cited 
by many domestic industries as a matter for national concern. Much 
less is known about the competitive performance and potential of Amer- 
ican industries in the markets of the major developing countries of the 
APR, and interest in this matter is only beginning to develop;' it is the 
focus of this paper. 
Section 2.2 provides an economic overview of the APR by comparing 
the main economic characteristics of the countries in the region and 
those of the region as a whole with other major groupings of countries. 
Since the prospects for exporting goods and services to the countries 
of the region depend on the policies these countries follow in such 
matters as promoting economic growth and the opening of domestic 
markets, section 2.3 briefly describes the economic policies pursued 
by each APR country in the recent past. This section also analyzes the 
success of major trading partners in penetrating the market for imports 
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in each country and the success of each country in exporting to major 
foreign markets. Finally, the trade and development policies likely to 
be followed in the future in each country are briefly discussed. 
Section 2.4 analyzes the competitive performance of the United States 
and its major competitors in the markets for imports in three groups 
of APR countries, namely, the advanced developing countries (ADCs) 
of the region-Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore; the resource- 
rich countries (RRCs) of the region-the Philippines, Malaysia, Thai- 
land, and Indonesia; and China. It also examines changes since the 
early 1960s in the shares of the import markets in these APR country 
groups captured by the United States, Canada, Japan, the European 
Community, Australia and New Zealand, and other countries within 
the region, together with changes in the commodity composition of 
exports to the APR groups from these countries and country-groups. 
A technique for revealing the sources of a country’s comparative ad- 
vantage is used to determine the relative factor-price advantages and 
disadvantages the United States has in its trade with the countries of 
the region. 
Section 2.5 briefly looks at the performance of the three APR coun- 
try-groups in exporting to the United States ana other major foreign 
markets and examines changes since the early 1960s in the share of 
their exports absorbed by the United States and other countries and 
shifts in the commodity composition of their exports. 
Because trade and investment are closely linked, it is necessary to 
take foreign investment into account in evaluating U.S. competitive 
prospects in the region. Section 2.6 examines the volume and country 
distribution of direct foreign investment in the region by the United 
States and its main competitor in the area, Japan. Changes in the 
relative importance of U.S. direct investment in different sectors in 
the APR countries are also studied. The final section summarizes the 
main conclusions of the paper. 
2.2 An Overview of Economic Characteristics and Performance 
2.2.1 The Developing Countries of APR Compared to 
Other Regions 
The tremendous market potential in the developing countries of the 
Asian Pacific rim lies simply in their being not only the most populous 
but the fastest-growing region of the world. The population of the nine 
countries totals 1.33 billion, whereas that of the next most populous 
region, South Asia, amounts to 0.87 billion. Gross national product 
(GNP) per capital in the nine countries grew at a remarkable average 
rate of 5.75 percent between 1965 and 1984. In contrast, GNP per capital 
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in the industrial market-economy countries increased at an average rate 
of only 2.5 percent during this period and at average rates of 1.9 percent 
in both South Asia and the countries of South America (World Devel- 
opment Report 1986, annex table 1). 
Table 2.1 compares the APR countries with a selected group of coun- 
tries outside of the area in terms of basic economic characteristics and 
performance indicators. Except for the Philippines, per capita income 
grew much more rapidly in the developing countries of the Asian Pacific 
rim than in mature developed countries such as the United States and 
West Germany and, in most cases, even Japan, the newest and most 
dynamic developed country. Yet, although per capita income levels in 
the APR countries rank among the highest for all developing nations, 
there is still a wide per capita income gap between the advanced in- 
dustrial market economies and these countries. West Germany’s 1984 
per capita income, for example, is more than five times as large as 
South Korea’s and almost seventeen times as large as the Philippines’ 
per capita income in that year. 
The magnitude of the APR’s output and imports is also small when 
compared to that of the developed countries. The total of all nine 
countries’ gross domestic product in 1984 was $656 billion, only slightly 
more than one-half of Japan’s and not much greater than West Ger- 
many’s GDP. The difference in imports is less striking due to the high 
degree of dependence on trade of most countries in the region. Their 
total 1984 imports of $181 billion are roughly equal to those of Japan 
and of West Germany in that year. Thus, the major market opportunities 
for the United States are still in other developed countries; the major 
developing countries of Southeast Asia and East Asia represent an 
important potential market rather than a major current one. 
Compared with other developing regions, however, the developing 
countries of the Asian Pacific rim already rank as the largest market. 
The 1984 $656 billion GDP level of the region compares with GDP 
levels of $623 billion for all of South America, Central America, and 
the Caribbean and of $406 billion for South Asia, for example. More- 
over, the 1984 $181 billion import level of the region compares with 
only $64 billion for South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 
and $25 billion for South Asia. This market-size advantage is likely to 
widen during the rest of the century, given the currently higher growth 
rates in the Pacific rim countries. 
Table 2.2 indicates the growth and trade experience of APR and 
selected other countries before and after the first oil crisis. The general 
slowdown in growth in both the developing and developed countries 
after the first oil shock is evident from the table. However, the relative 
decline in growth rates has been less in the APR countries than in such 
developed countries as the United States, Japan, and Germany. In the 
Table 2.1 Basic Economic Indicators 
Area Population Income Goods Trade 
GNP per Capita 
Growth Rate GDP 1984 Growth 1965-84 GNP per Exports Share Imports Share 
(thousands Size 1973-84 (billions (average annual Capita Exports 1984 Imports 1984 in GDP, 1984 in GDP, 1984 
KmZ) (million) (%) of $) % rate) 1984 ($) (billion $) (billion $) (%) (%I 
Singapore 1 
Hong Kong 1 
Taiwan 35 
South Korea 98 
Malaysia 330 
Thailand 514 
Philippines 300 
Indonesia 1,919 
China 9,561 
United States 9,363 
Japan 372 
West Germany 249 
Australia 7,687 
India 3,288 
3 1.3 
5 2.4 
19 1.6 
40 1.5 
15 2.4 
50 2.2 
53 2.7 
159 2.3 
1,029 1.4 
237 1.0 
120 1.0 
61 0 
16 1.3 
749 2.3 
18 7.8 
31 6.2 
57 7.0 
83 6.6 
29 4.5 
42 4.2 
33 2.6 
81 4.9 
281 4.5 
3,635 1.7 
1,255 4.7 
613 2.7 
182 1.7 
162 1.6 
7,260 
6,330 
3,050 
2,110 
1,980 
860 
660 
540 
310 
15,390 
10,360 
11,130 
11,740 
260 
24 
28 
30 
29 
16 
7 
5 
22 
25 
216 
170 
171 
23 
9 
29 
29 
26 
31 
14 
11 
6 
14 
26 
338 
134 
153 
23 
15 
133 
90 
56 
35 
55 
17 
15 
27 
9 
6 
14 
28 
13 
6 
161 
94 
45 
37 
48 
26 
18 
17 
9 
9 
11 
25 
13 
9 
Source: World Development Report, 1986. 
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Table 2.2 Savings and Investment Rates 
Gross Domestic Gross Domestic 
Invest- Savings 
of GDP GDP Resource Gap 
ment as Share as Share of 
(%) (%) (%) 
1960 1984 1960 1984 1960 1984 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
China 
11 
19 
20 
11 
14 
16 
16 
8 
25a 
47 
24 
22 
29 
31 
23 
18 
21 
30 
3 
1 
13 
1 
27 
17 
16 
8 
25" 
43 
29 
33 
30 
32 
21 
18 
20 
30 
-8 
- 18 
-7 
- 10 
13 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-4 
5 
12 
1 
1 
-2  
0 
-1 
0 
United States 18 19 19 16 1 - 3  
Japan 34 28 34 31 0 3 
West Germany 27 21 29 23 2 2 
Australia 29 21 25 19 -4 - 2  
India 17 24 14 22 - 3  -2 
Sources: World Development Report, 1979 and 1986; Asian Development Bank, Key 
Indicators of Developing Country Member Countries of ADB, 1984, and ADB Annual 
Report, 1985. 
a1965. 
United States, the percentage decline in the average annual growth rate 
of GDP between 1965-73 and 1973-84 was 28 percent; in Japan, 56 
percent; and in Germany, 57 percent. The average annual GDP growth 
rate actually increased in Hong Kong and Malaysia (also India) and 
declined by only 18 percent on the average in the other seven developing 
countries in the Asian Pacific rim. 
2.2.2 Diversity among the APR Countries 
As shown in table 2.1, there are significant economic differences 
among the developing countries of the Asian Pacific rim. It is usual to 
divide the countries into three groups, the first comprising South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; the second consisting of the Phil- 
ippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia; and the third being China. 
The first group is usually designated the newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) of Asia, a term indicating their relatively early emphasis on 
export-oriented industrialization. While the words newZy industrializing 
were appropriate in the 1960s and early 1970s when these countries 
first adopted policies aimed at significantly increasing the exports of 
manufactures, it seems more appropriate to use Hong and Krause's 
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(1981) term, “advanced developing countries” (ADCs), especially since 
other countries of the region later also adopted policies aimed at export- 
oriented industrialization. Per capita income in all of the ADCs is higher 
than in the countries of the other two groups, though if per capita 
income alone is the basis of the classification, it seems reasonable to 
include Malaysia in the first group. There is also a significant gap 
between income levels in Singapore and Hong Kong and in Taiwan and 
South Korea. 
The second group of four nations is usually described as the four 
resource-rich countries (RRCs) that are ASEAN members to indicate 
the much greater share of primary products in their exports compared 
to the ADCs (see table 2.3) .2  The greater share of production devoted 
to agriculture is an indication of their greater land resources as well as 
their lower per capita income levels. Except for Malaysia, the RRCs 
are less open than the ADCs of Asia in terms of trade’s share of GDP; 
these countries have pursued import-substitution policies more vig- 
orously than the ADCs. Another difference is the higher natural rate 
of population growth in the RRCs than in the ADCS.~ 
China is unique in several respects. It is by far the most populous 
country in the world, and it ranks third in area. Although it has become 
much more outward-looking in recent years, it remains, as the export 
and import shares presented in table 2.1 indicate, a very closed econ- 
Table 2.3 External Public and Private Debt 
Total Long-Term Debt Total Long-Term Debt 
Disbursed and Service as Percentage 
Outstanding of Exports of Goods 
(millions of $) and Services 
1970 1984 1970 1984 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
152.3 
2” 
1,199 
1,972 
39 0 a  
726 
1,494 
2,904 
1,911a 
270a 
6,147‘ 
29,990 
11,846“ 
10,936 
14,135 
26,683 
.6 
0” 
- 
20.3 
3.6a 
14.0 
7.Y 
13.8 
. 8d 
0“ 
4.3c 
15.8 
5 . I d  
21.5 
17.9 
19.0 
Sources: World Development Report, 1984 and 1986; Asian Development Bank, Key 
Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB, April 1984. 
aLong-term public and publicly guaranteed debt. 
bExternal public debt outstanding, 1971. 
CExternal public debt outstanding, 1981. 
dLong-term public and publicly guaranteed debt, 1982. 
‘External public debt outstanding. 
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omy compared to other countries in the region, although not in com- 
parison to such countries as India and the United States. While its 
GDP growth rate since 1965 compares favorably with the RRCs, China’s 
low per capita income level makes the country more similar to the 
countries of South Asia than to those of the Asian Pacific rim. 
2.2.3 Savings-Investment, Foreign Debt, and Trade Adjustment 
A necessary, though not sufficient, requirement for a country to raise 
its growth rate is to increase its investment and savings rates signifi- 
cantly. As table 2.4 shows, such an increase has occurred in the ADCs, 
the RRCs, and China. In five of the nine countries, investment as a 
share of GDP rose by more than ten percentage points between 1960 
and 1984, and in three others the increase was at least five percentage 
points. The investment ratio in Singapore in 1984 was an incredible 47 
percent, and it was 30 percent or more in Taiwan, Malaysia, and China. 
The increase in domestic savings has been even more impressive, es- 
pecially in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Indo- 
nesia. Gross domestic savings is now about 30 percent or more in six 
of the nine countries. The only developed countries that can match 
these savings rates are Japan (31 percent) and Norway (35 percent). 
An excess of domestic investment over domestic savings indicates 
that savings by foreigners are financing part of a country’s investment 
activities. Such was the case for the ADCs in the initial phases of their 
takeoff to high rates of growth, as the figures in table 2.4 on the resource 
gap indicate. The large positive number for Hong Kong in 1984 indicates 
that domestic savers were investing some of their savings abroad, prob- 
ably because of their uncertainty about the political future of the city- 
state. 
A more direct indication of the extent to which a country has relied 
on external sources of finance is the magnitude of its external debt and 
the ratio of the external debt to the country’s GNP. The debt service 
share of exports of goods and services is a rough indicator of the degree 
of difficulty the country has in meeting its external obligations. Table 
2.5 presents information on these various debt indicators for the APR 
countries, except for China, on which debt data are unavailable. As 
with developing countries generally, the data show a very rapid increase 
in external borrowing for APR countries over the last fifteen years. 
This ability to draw upon external sources, especially private capital 
markets, has been an important factor in enabling growth to continue 
at high rates. It has, however, also led to serious debt-servicing prob- 
lems for some nations that borrowed heavily and then around 1980 
were suddenly faced with both much higher real interest rates and 
falling prices for their export products. Four APR countries-South 
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia-are on most lists of 
Table 2.4 Growth Rates of GDP and Foreign Trade 
Terms of 
GDP Exports Imports Trade 
(%) (%) (%) (1980 = 100) 
1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84 1965-73 1973-84 1982 1984 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
China 
United States 
Japan 
West Germany 
Australia 
India 
13.0 
7.9 
7.9 
10.0 
6.7 
7.8 
5.4 
8.1 
7.8 
3.2 
9.8 
4.6 
5.6 
3.9 
8.2 
9.1 
9.3" 
7.2 
7.3 
6.8 
4.8 
6.8 
6.6 
2.3 
4.3 
2.0 
2.4 
4.1 
11.0 
11.7 
23.7b 
31.7 
8.0 
6.9 
4.2 
11.1 
- 
6.8 
14.7 
10.7 
9.3 
2.4 
7.1 
12.9 
16.7c 
15.1 
7.5 
10.4 
5.6 
1.4 
10.1 
2.3 
7.5 
4.5 
3 .O 
3.3 
9.8 7.1 
10.6 9.3 
17.9b 13.5a 
22.4 9.7 
4.4 8.9 
4.4 5.9 
3.0 2.3 
14.0 10.5 
- 10.2 
9.4 3.8 
14.9 1.6 
11.3 3.9 
6.8 3.4 
- 5.7 5.4 
100 
110 
100 
85 
77 
89 
105 
106 
106 
103 
97 
98 
104 
- 
101 
109 
100 
93 
81 
101 
101 
101 
112 
109 
96 
95 
107 
Sources: World Development Report, 1979 and 1986; Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing 
Member Countries of ADB, 1984. 
"1973-83. 
1960-70. 
1970-77. 
Table 2.5 Commodity Structure of Production and Trade (percentage shares) 
Production, 1984 Exports, 1983 Imports 
Primary Primary 
Agriculture Industry Services Goods Manufactures Goods Manufactures 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
China 
United States 
Japan 
West Germany 
Australia 
India 
1 
1 
14 
21 
20 
25 
26 
36 
4 
3 
2 
- 
35 
39 
22 
40 
35 
28 
34 
40 
44 
43 
41 
46 
- 
27 
60 
78 
47 
44 
52 
41 
34 
23 
54 
56 
52 
38 
44 
8 
6a 
9 
78 
68 
49 
92 
43 
30 
3 
13 
71 
41 
56 
92 
94a 
91 
22 
32 
51 
8 
51 
70 
97 
87 
23 
53 
44 
25 
49 
28 
36 
40 
38 
34 
3 1  
71 
42 
20 
50 
56 
I 5  
51 
72 
64 
60 
62 
66 
63 
23 
58 
80 
50 
- 
Source: World Development Report, 1986. 
a1982. 
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countries faced with significant debt-servicing problems; debt-servicing 
charges in 1984 claimed more than 15 percent of the foreign exchange 
they earned from exporting goods and services. The drain of debt 
servicing on the foreign exchange earnings of Singapore and Hong Kong 
is negligible and only about 5 percent for Taiwan and Malaysia. 
To cope with increased debt-servicing charges, a country must gen- 
erate additional foreign exchange by improving its balance of trade. 
Table 2.6 shows that the trade balance of the four main indebted coun- 
tries-South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia-im- 
proved between 1983 and 1985. Korea, whose balance of trade has 
improved steadily since 1981, achieved the most desirable type of trade 
adjustment between these years-an expansion of imports and exports. 
Thailand’s improved trade balance between 1983 and 1985 came about 
through an expansion of exports and contraction of imports, whereas 
the recent trade adjustment in the Philippines and Indonesia occurred 
by reducing both exports and imports. 
Table 2.6 Merchandise Trade of Four Indebted Countries in the Asian Pacific 
Rim, 1981-85 (billions of dollars, exports [f.o.b.], imports [c.i.f.]) 
Korea Philippines Thailand Indonesia 
1980 
Exports 
lmports 
Balance 
1982 
Exports 
Imports 
Balance 
1983 
Exports 
Imports 
Balance 
1984 
Exports 
Imports 
Balance 
1985 
Exports 
Imports 
Balance 
21.1 
26.1 
4.9 
21.9 
24.3 
- 2.4 
24.5 
26.2 
- 1.7 
29.2 
30.6 
- 1.4 
30.3 
31.1 
- .8 
5.7 
8.5 
-2.8 
5.0 
8.3 
-3.3 
4.9 
8.0 
-3.1 
5.3 
6.4 
- 1.1 
4.6 
5.5 
- .9 
7.0 
9.9 
-2.9 
7.0 
8.6 
- 1.6 
6.4 
10.3 
-3.9 
7.4 
10.4 
- 3.0 
7.1 
9.2 
-2.1 
22.3 
13.3 
9.0 
22.3 
16.9 
5.4 
21.1 
16.3 
4.8 
21.9 
13.9 
8.0 
19.7 
10.2 
9.5 
Sources: International Trade, 1984-85, table A-4; and International Trade, 1985-86, 
table A-14, both from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
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2.3 Development Policy and Trade Performance 
As with most developing countries in the world, the major economic 
goal of those in the Asian Pacific rim over the last forty years has been 
to increase the rate of economic development. Their success in achiev- 
ing this goal and the extent to which their development policies involve 
a willingness to open their own markets to the products of other coun- 
tries largely determine the trading opportunities of the United States 
and others in the region. This section briefly describes the nature of 
the development strategies pursued by the individual APR countries 
and analyzes the shifts that have taken place in the commodity com- 
position and geographical distribution of their exports and imports. It 
also speculates as to each country’s likely future trade and development 
policies. 
2.3.1 The Advanced Developing Countries 
Hong Kong 
Trade and development policy. The British colony of Hong Kong is 
unique among developing economies in that it has achieved its re- 
markable post-World War I1 growth under a policy of “positive non- 
inter~ention.”~ Imports and exports of both goods and capital were 
completely free from government taxes, subsidies, or other controls, 
and no effort was made to direct investment into particular sectors. 
The standard tax rate on earnings and profit was also the lowest of any 
industrial state, being set at the level of 12.5 percent from 1951-66. 
Until the early 1950s, Hong Kong’s prosperity was based on reex- 
porting products from South China throughout the world and serving 
as an entry port for foreign products destined for the mainland. Two 
external events in the 1950s disrupted this entrepbt role. The first was 
the change of government as the Communists took control of the main- 
land. The inward-looking policies of the Communist government re- 
sulted in a significant diminution in China’s trade with Hong Kong. In 
addition, dissatisfaction with the new form of government led to mas- 
sive immigration from China, which increased Hong Kong’s population 
by almost 50 percent in a few years. The second event that reduced 
Hong Kong’s role as a trade facilitator was the United Nations embargo 
imposed on China because of its role in the Korean War. 
Fortunately, the immigrants included entrepreneurs who had both 
industrial experience, especially in textiles, and the capital necessary 
to establish manufacturing activities. Utilizing the abundant supply of 
low-wage workers who also became available through immigration, 
these individuals spearheaded the shift in Hong Kong’s economic struc- 
ture from that of entrepbt to exporter of labor-intensive manufactured 
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products. The industrialization effort was also helped by the existence 
of an excellent infrastructure of port, banking, insurance, and shipping 
facilities and a long history of commercial ties with overseas traders. 
Manufacturing employment increased from 82,000 in 1950 to 216,000 
in 1960, while the share of reexports in total exports declined from 88 
percent to 27 percent in that decade. 
Trade performance. As can be seen from table 2.7, which indicates the 
colony’s pattern of exports and imports in 1960, 1978, and 1983, Hong 
Kong has gradually diversified its manufacturing activities and, in par- 
ticular, reduced its dependence on textiles and clothing. Exports in the 
machinery and transport equipment category have become significant. 
This diversification has been due in part to the efforts of the govern- 
ment, which, beginning in the late 1970s, backed away somewhat from 
its hands-off policy and began to arrange industrial support facilities 
and technical services to facilitate the shift toward more capital-inten- 
sive, high-skill manufacturing sectors. 
A more detailed breakdown of the composition of Hong Kong’s trade 
with its major trading partners is presented in table 2.8. Between 1963 
and 1980, both the United States and Japan moderately increased their 
share of the combined exports to Hong Kong by the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the European Community, 
other ADCs, the RRCs in the region, and China. The U.S. share in- 
Table 2.7 Structure of Hong Kong’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 
1983 (percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
1960 5 15 45 4 31 
1978 1 2 46 15 36 
1983 2 6 33 22 36 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuel Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 27 3 16 10 44 
1978 15 5 7 19 54 
1983 12 7 6 21 54 
Sources: World Development Report ,  1981 and 1986. 
Table 2.8 Distribution of Singapore’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
European 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
and New Zealand 
Community 
Total 
16.5 
1.9 
29.3 
35.0 19.4 
3.0 1 .o 
4.3 34.2 
50.3 
3.7 
4.7 
18.3 40.7 
I .O 3.2 
33.8 4.2 
12.1 
0.6 
28.0 
50.1 
3.6 
4.2 
0.0 
31.2 
8.4 
8.4 
- -
100.0 
4.9 3.6 
43.9 25.6 
0.4 11.1 
7.8 4.8 
0.2 - 
100.0 100.0 
-
4.4 
29.2 
4.3 
2.3 
0.2 
100.0 
2.7 3.9 
21.3 36.3 
16.5 5.1 
6.1 3.4 
- 2.8 
100.0 100.0 
-
1.8 
13.4 
11.8 
2.2 
29.7 
100.0 
-
3.5 
22.9 
3.7 
2.6 
9.0 
100.0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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creased from 16 percent to 18 percent. The countries that increased 
their export share the most, however, were the other ADCs, that is, 
Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore; their share rose from 8 percent to six- 
teen percent between these years, despite the exclusion from the figures 
of exports from Taiwan to Hong Kong in 1980 (and 1984). The European 
Community and the four resource-rich countries, namely, the Philip- 
pines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, were the losers in terms of 
export shares between 1963 and 1980. 
The major change between 1980 and 1984 was the emergence of China 
as a major supplier to the Hong Kong market. In 1984 almost 30 percent 
of exports to Hong Kong came from China. Of course, much of this 
reflects the reemergence of entrepbt trade for Hong Kong as China 
became more open. The U.S. market share declined about a third 
between 1980 and 1984 (from 18 percent to 12 percent), due no doubt 
in part to the appreciation of the dollar relative to other major curren- 
cies after 1980. Japan’s share also declined between these years but 
less in relative terms than the U.S. share. 
Table 2.8 also shows the country-region distribution of Hong Kong’s 
own exports between 1963 and 1984. The share of exports to the United 
States increased from 35 percent in 1963 to 50 percent in 1970 and then 
declined to 41 percent by the end of the 1970s, a decade in which the 
dollar depreciated. As the dollar appreciated in the early 1980s, the 
share of Hong Kong’s exports absorbed by the United States again 
rose to 50 percent. The value of Hong Kong’s exports to the United 
States in 1984 was $7.8 billion compared to $2.8 billion of imports from 
the United States. Remarkably, the share of exports absorbed by Japan 
remained at about 4 percent over the entire period. In contrast, the 
trend in the EC share was downward over the period, with an especially 
sharp fall evident after 1980. 
The main factor in Hong Kong’s long-term economic outlook is the 
coming return of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China in 1997. The 
agreement reached in 1984 between the United Kingdom and China 
called for the maintenance of Hong Kong’s market-oriented economy 
for at least fifty years after 1997, but, despite this provision, there is 
understandably a great deal of uncertainty about the future. 
Singapore 
Trade and development policies. The economy of Singapore, like 
that of Hong Kong, was for many years based on entrep6t trade, spe- 
cifically, the processing, repackaging, and reexporting of the primary 
products of Southeast Asia to other areas and the reexporting of im- 
ported industrial goods to other parts of Asia.5 Following the attainment 
of self-government in 1959, Singapore adopted an industrialization 
strategy that has passed through three stages: an import substitution 
93 U.S. and Foreign Competition in the APR Developing Countries 
phase from 1960 to 1966; a labor-intensive, export-oriented phase from 
1966 to 1970; and since 1970 a higher-technology, skill-intensive phase 
that is also export oriented (Yue 1980). 
The first phase, which involved the use of tariffs and quotas to stim- 
ulate domestic manufacturing, was closely tied to the prospect of a 
Malaysian common market. Government officials thought that this mar- 
ket would be of sufficient size for Singapore to become an.efficient 
supplier of manufactured products, given temporary protection. But 
the political union of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore lasted 
only from 1963 to 1965, and with Singapore’s withdrawal from the 
federation, the proposal for a Malaysian common market collapsed. 
Although import protection was increased to ease the domestic ad- 
justments related to the country’s withdrawal from the federation, the 
development strategy shifted around 1966 to one of attracting foreign 
investment to expanding exports of labor-intensive manufactures. In 
addition to establishing new tax incentives to attract foreign investors, 
the government introduced restrictive labor legislation to restrain wage 
increases and maintain stable labor relations, restructured the educa- 
tional system to provide more technical workers, and provided a wide 
range of facilities and services to industrialists. The outcome was a 
rapid decrease in unemployment, an increase in the share of domestic 
exports in total exports from 25 percent in 1965 to 38 percent in 1970, 
and a marked acceleration of the growth rate. 
As the upward pressure on wages increased due to the success of 
these measures, Singapore began to shift to a new development strategy 
in the early 1970s, emphasizing exports of skill-intensive, higher-tech- 
nology products. To stimulate the export of these products, the gov- 
ernment provided equity and loan assistance to firms producing them, 
expanded training facilities and gave financial support to private sector 
training activities, allocated funds for financing export bills below the 
prime rate, subsidized the insurance of export activities, and undertook 
extensive export-promotion programs. Beginning in 1969, most tariffs 
and quotas also were reduced or abolished to enable exporting firms 
to obtain needed inputs at competitive world prices, and by the mid- 
1970s, Singapore’s level of protection was very low. 
The extent to which Singapore has relied on foreign investment to 
increase its exports of manufactured goods is indicated by the fact that, 
in 1980, export sales by wholly foreign-owned firms constituted 72 
percent of the economy’s total exports of manufactured goods, export 
sales by joint ventures 21 percent, and export sales by wholly locally 
owned firms only 7 percent. Another notable feature of the country’s 
development policy is the high rate of domestic savings achieved by 
compulsory retirement contributions by employers and employees. By 
1978 the contribution rate reached 38.5 percent of wages and salaries 
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and contributed 22 percent of total national savings. The government 
has used these funds to provide an infrastructure that is conducive to 
development. 
Trade performance. Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore never relied on 
textiles and clothing as an important export product, as table 2.9 shows. 
Instead, its industrialization via the export route has been based mainly 
on oil refining and, to an increasing extent, on skill-intensive machinery 
and other manufactures. Industrialization has also expanded the market 
within Singapore for high-skill, high-technology products, as the changes 
in the country’s import pattern indicate. 
The United States has done very well in the Singapore market (table 
2.101, increasing its export share from 7 percent in 1963 to 21 percent 
in 1984-a performance that outdid the Japanese export share increase. 
The other ADCs also gained in market share, while the EC and, es- 
pecially, the RCCs lost in relative terms. On the export side, the figures 
show that the shares of Singapore’s exports taken by both the United 
States and Japan rose between 1963 and 1984, the United States from 
13 percent to 27 percent, and Japan from 8 percent to 12 percent. As 
would be expected from exchange rate developments, the increase in 
the share of exports going to the United States was especially large 
between 1980 and 1984. Export to the United States in 1984 totaled 
$4.7 billion, while imports from the United States in that year amounted 
Table 2.9 Structure of Singapore’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
1960 1 73 5 7 14 
1978 31 23 5 25 16 
1980 31 13 4 31 22 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 21 15 38 7 21 
1978 10 24 9 29 23 
1983 7 31 6 30 26 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
Table 2.10 Distribution of Singapore’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 7.3 13.3 12.9 18.9 18.2 17.8 21.7 26.9 
Canada - 1.8 0.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 1 .o 
Japan 16.0 7.7 24.3 13.0 24.0 10.8 28.1 11.8 
Australia 
and New Zealand 5.7 6.9 5.5 5.1 3.6 7.9 4.2 5.3 
European 25.0 29.9 17.7 29.6 15.0 15.5 16.0 11.9 
Community 
ADCs 1.6 6.3 5.3 9.6 3.9 15.1 5.1 12.3 
RRCs 44.2 32.8 - 33.3 18.8 34.1 29.5 16.2 29.2 
China - 0.9 - 2.5 - 2.0 7.7 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-
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to $3.5 billion. Shipments to other ADCs also increased in relative 
terms over the twenty-one-year period. In contrast, the share of Sin- 
gapore’s exports received by the EC fell from 29 percent to 12 percent 
from 1963 to 1984. 
There is no alternative for Singapore, if it is to continue to raise its 
living standard, but to remain an open, export-oriented economy. At 
the same time, one can expect to see a continued shift in the compo- 
sition of its exports toward higher-labor-skill products, while importing 
high-technology goods as well as products where scale economies are 
important. 
Korea 
Trade and development policies. From 1945 to 1960, Korea followed 
an import-substitution development policy, using high protective tar- 
iffs, quantitative import restrictions, and a multiple exchange rate sys- 
tem with a generally overvalued currency to stimulate domestic pro- 
duction for local markets .6 While growth was fairly impressive during 
the 1950s, it was largely induced by substantial U.S.  aid following the 
Korean War. For example, 74 percent of Korean investment was fi- 
nanced by foreign aid between 1953 and 1960. The growth rate began 
to decline in the late 1950s as the easy import substitution opportunities 
were exploited and U.S. economic aid was reduced. The degree of 
inwardness of the economy at that time is indicated by the fact that 
exports of goods and services were only 3 percent of GDP in 1960, 
whereas they had climbed to 36 percent by 1980. 
A significant shift in Korean development policy toward an outward- 
looking strategy occurred following the student revolution in 1960 and 
the military coup in 1961. The won was devalued and a unitary exchange 
rate system established, the interest rate was permitted to rise to en- 
courage domestic savings, and a stabilization program was imple- 
mented. A number of export incentives were introduced, including 
exemption from tariffs on imported inputs and capital equipment for 
use in export production, accelerated depreciation on capital facilities 
employed in export production, and a lowering of direct taxes on in- 
come earned from exporting. Exporters also had access to credit below 
the market rate of interest, received preferential electricity and trans- 
portation rates, and were granted generous wastage allowances on 
imported inputs. 
In the late 1970s another change in development policy occurred as 
government leaders, fearing that Korea was losing its competitive ad- 
vantage in labor-intensive manufactures due to rising real wages, began 
to encourage the production of capital-intensive intermediate products. 
This policy shift was reversed in the early 1980s and priority again 
given to export expansion as the major engine of growth. 
W U.S. and Foreign Competition in the APR Developing Countries 
The rate of growth that followed the shift in development strategy 
toward export promotion can only be described as phenomenal. Per 
capita incomes rose at an average annual rate of 7 percent between 
1960 and 1980. During the export-led industrial transformation, the 
share of manufactures in total exports increased from 14 percent in 
1960 to 91 percent in 1983 (table 2.1 I), and domestic savings as afraction 
of GDP rose from 1 percent to 30 percent between 1960 and 1984 (table 
2.4). 
A feature of Korean policy of considerable concern to the United 
States and other industrial countries with which Korea has a large 
export surplus is the continuing high levels of protection in both the 
agricultural and industrial sectors that make it difficult for foreign sup- 
pliers to sell in the Korean market. 
Trade performance. As table 2.12 indicates, the United States’ export 
share in the Korean import market, after falling sharply from 49 percent 
to 31 percent between 1963 and 1970, increased slightly to 34 percent 
between 1970 and 1980 and then remained constant thereafter. Japan 
was the main gainer at U.S. expense between 1963 and 1970, with its 
share rising from 35 percent to 49 percent, but this share had fallen 
back to about 41 percent by 1984. Australia and New Zealand, Canada, 
and the RRCs have all gained steadily in market share throughout the 
twenty-one-year period. 
Table 2.11 Structure of Korea’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
6 1960 30 56 8 
1978 1 10 32 21 36 
1983 3 6 25 32 34 
- 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 10 7 25 12 46 
1978 8 16 17 33 26 
1983 8 27 14 29 22 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
Table 2.12 Country Distribution of Korea’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 
1970, 1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S.  49.5 32.5 31.1 50.7 33.7 35.2 33.5 46.4 
Canada 0.7 0.3 1.1 2.5 3.3 2.6 3.2 3.8 
Japan 34.7 34.5 49.4 29.8 40.4 23.0 41.2 20.2 
Australia 
and New Zealand I .8 0.3 0.9 1 .o 3.9 I .9 5.3 1.9 
European 
Community 7.1 9.3 9.4 8.6 10.0 20.8 10.1 14.5 
ADCs 4.0 18.4 2.5 5.9 2.3 9.9 2.2 8.9 
China - 
RRCs 1.8 4.5 - 5.2 - 1.3 6.0 - 6.3 ~ 4.1 3.9 
- - - - - - - 
Tot a1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
99 U.S. and Foreign Competition in the APR Developing Countries 
The distribution of Korean exports exhibits considerable volatility. 
Exports to the United States, for example, constituted 50 percent of 
all exports to the regions listed in the first column in 1970, rising from 
32 percent in 1963, then dropping to 35 percent in 1980, only to rise 
again to 46 percent during the period of dollar appreciation in the early 
1980s. In value terms, Korean exports to the United States in 1984 
came to $10.5 billion compared to imports of $5.8 billion. The share 
of exports sent to Japan shows a steady decline over the entire period. 
In contrast, exports to the European Community display an upward 
trend. 
Because the country’s poor endowment of natural resource and com- 
paratively small size leave no alternative for achieving continued rapid 
growth but to retain the emphasis on exporting manufactured goods, 
Korea is likely to remain an outward-looking economy. Like Singapore, 
it can be expected to move into higher-skill, more capital-intensive 
export production, however. At the same time, with some prodding it 
should become a better market for high-technology goods and agri- 
cultural products. 
As regards international political relations, the Republic of Korea’s 
relations with North Korea are of major concern to the United States. 
Because of the perceived threat of aggression from the north, the United 
States still maintains military forces in South Korea and has a treaty 
commitment to the country’s security. The U.S. government favors 
gradual reunification between North and South Korea, but there seems 
little prospect for that to take place in the short term. Yet the prospect 
for reasonably peaceful relations between the two countries in the short 
term seems favorable. 
Taiwan 
Trade and development policies. There was great political and eco- 
nomic turmoil in Taiwan in the period immediately after World War II.’ 
The end of fifty years of Japanese rule and thus the loss of the country’s 
traditional export market was followed by the Communists’ takeover 
of mainland China, the Nationalists’ assumption of power in Taiwan 
with a large immigration from the mainland, and the loss of another 
important market in China. 
The government’s first response to the economic problems it faced 
was to undertake a land reform program in the agricultural sector and 
an import substitution policy with high levels of protection for the 
manufacturing sector. The country’s adjustment efforts were assisted 
by a substantial inflow of foreign aid, mainly from the United States. 
Between 1951 and 1959, 37 percent of total investment was financed 
by foreign aid. 
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Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing into the early 1960s, the 
government introduced policies that changed Taiwan’s development 
strategy from one of import substitution to one that emphasized the 
export of labor-intensive manufactures. The multiple exchange rate 
system was abolished and the overvaluation of the country’s currency 
corrected by a series of devaluations. Import controls were eased and 
tariffs reduced on many manufactured goods. (As in Korea, the Tai- 
wanese government still highly protects some domestic industries with 
import controls and tariffs.) Investment by foreigners and local resi- 
dents was encouraged by such measures as a five-year income tax 
holiday for certain new industrial establishments, a sharp reduction in 
the maximum business income tax, and tax exemption for undistributed 
profits retained for investment purposes. Exporting was also encour- 
aged directly by rebating customs duties on imported inputs, permitting 
the deduction from taxable income of an amount equal to 2 percent of 
annual export earnings, and allowing a 10 percent tax deduction for 
manufacturing, mining, and handicraft firms that exported more than 
50 percent of their output. In addition, some industries received direct 
export subsidies that were financed by levies on domestic sales. Low- 
interest loans and government assistance in the form of marketing, 
managerial, and technical services were also available for exporting 
activities. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the government also established 
duty- and tax-free export-processing zones. 
Trade performance. As in the Korean case, the post-World War I1 
development policies of Taiwan transformed the country from an ag- 
ricultural to an industrial economy within a comparatively short period. 
In the period 1952-54, industrial exports made up only 9 percent of 
total exports, but in 1970 the share of industrial exports in total exports 
was up to a level of 78 percent; by 1982, this figure had risen to 88 
percent. 
As table 2.13 shows, changes in the country or regional distribution 
of Taiwan’s imports between 1963 and 1984 are similar to those of 
Korea. The U.S. share of imports into Taiwan declined sharply from 
43 percent to 26 percent between 1963 and 1970, then increased to 33 
percent in 1980 and remained constant thereafter. As in the Korean 
case, Japan’s export share rose considerably between the first two 
years (from 35 percent to 52 percent), then declined to 40 percent by 
1980 and remained there over the next four years. The EC’s export 
share also rose over the entire period. In contrast to the Korean case, 
however, the export share of the other ADCs rose, whereas that of the 
RRCs fell. 
Since the UNCTAD trade data tape does not contain exports from 
Taiwan for 1980 and 1984, the country-region composition of Taiwanese 
Table 2.13 Distribution of Taiwan’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 43.1 19.9 25.7 44.2 33.0 
Canada 1.1 2.1 1.3 3.9 1.6 
Japan 34.7 38.4 51.7 16.7 40.4 
Australia 
and New Zealand 5.0 1.2 3.0 I .6 3.4 
European 
Community 7.1 10.2 8.7 11.0 9.8 
ADCs 2.4 20.5 3.3 15.6 5.3 
RRCs 6.4 7.3 6.0 6.6 6.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
China 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - ~ 
- 4.9 - 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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exports is given for 1963 and 1970 only. These years show the marked 
shift in the direction of Taiwanese exports toward the United States. 
From accounting for only 20 percent of these exports in 1963, the U.S. 
share had increased to 44 percent by 1970. U.S. trade data indicate 
that in 1982, Taiwanese exports to the United States amounted to $8.8 
billion, whereas imports from the United States totaled $3.9 billion. 
The European community’s share rose slightly. The most significant 
other shift between these years was the fall in Japan’s share from 38 
percent to 17 percent. 
Like Korea, to achieve continued rapid growth, Taiwan has no al- 
ternative but to concentrate on exporting manufactured goods, but it 
can be expected to shift toward higher-skill-requiring, more-capital- 
intensive products. As it is pressured to liberalize its own trade barriers, 
Taiwan should improve as a market for high-technology manufactures 
and agricultural products. 
There is, of course, considerable uncertainty about the political fu- 
ture of Taiwan. In proposing unification, China has offered to make 
Taiwan a special administrative region, following the Hong Kong ap- 
proach, and allow it to maintain its economic and social system. Thus 
far, however, no visible progress has been made toward reunification, 
despite Taiwan’s increasing political isolation in the world. The official 
position of the U.S. government seems to be that a gradual and natural 
process of unification is the best solution and that other countries 
should neither speed up or slow down this process. 
2.3.2 The Resource-Rich Countries 
The Philippines 
Trade and development policies. The development policy of the Phil- 
ippines since the late 1940s can be characterized as initially one of 
import substitution, followed by a series of modest and short-lived 
efforts to liberalize the trade and exchange-rate regimes.8 Exchange 
controls were first introduced in late 1949 as a consequence of a balance 
of payments crisis caused immediately by the election-related easy 
credit and liberal spending policies of the government and more basi- 
cally by the country’s overvalued currency and pent-up demand for 
consumption goods. Rather than lifting the controls after the crisis 
passed, the government used them during the 1950s to promote the 
development of domestic manufacturing activities. As often happened 
in developing countries that follow this strategy, growth rates initially 
were quite high, but by the late 1950s, as the easy stage of import 
substitution had passed, they had fallen significantly. 
Devaluation, the elimination of most exchange controls, and the 
establishment of a unified exchange rate system occurred in the early 
1960s, but these changes were in response to charges of maladminis- 
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tration of the controls and pressures from traditional exporters rather 
than to a conscious decision to promote exports of manufactures. High 
tariffs still protected the manufacturing sector, although its growth rate 
fell even further in the early 1960s. An effort in the late 1960s to 
stimulate growth through credit and fiscal expansion led to a new bal- 
ance of payments crisis and the reintroduction of exchange controls. 
The 1970s began with the floating of the peso and the passage of 
legislation aimed directly at stimulating exports of nontraditional ag- 
ricultural and manufactured goods. Firms exporting more than 50 per- 
cent of their output were exempt from sales or customs taxes on ma- 
terials used in export production and permitted to deduct part of their 
export revenue from taxable income. The government also constructed 
the first export-processing zone. Partly in response to these measures 
but probably due more importantly to the 50 percent decline in real 
wage costs in manufcturing between 1969 and 1974, there was sustained 
gowth in manufacturing exports until 1981 (Alburo and Shepherd 1986). 
The share of manufacturing exports in total exports rose from 12 per- 
cent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1980. 
Further liberalization efforts were undertaken in the early 1980s, the 
most important of which was the reduction of tariffs under a new, more 
rational system of import protection, but the exchange crisis of 1983, 
related to the country’s external debt problems, prevented the full 
implementation of the measures as exchange controls were introduced 
once again. Since 1984 the cutoff of foreign capital, the austerity mea- 
sures the government was forced to adopt, and the political crisis in 
the country have brought about a decline in real GNP. 
Trade performance. The commodity distribution of the Philippines’ 
exports and imports is given in table 2.14. Primary product exports 
other than minerals have declined significantly between 1960 and 1983 
as the share taken by manufactured goods rose from 4 percent to 50 
percent. In contrast, due to the greater importance of fuel imports, the 
share of imports of manufactured goods fell from 75 percent to 65 
percent between 1960 and 1983. 
The Philippines is another case where the U.S. share of the country’s 
import market decreased significantly between 1963 and 1970, while 
Japan’s share increased significantly (table 2.15). The U.S, export share 
rose in the 1970s and, despite the exchange rate developments, rose 
again in the 1980s. The other major gainers were the ADCs, whose 
share of the Philippines’ imports went up from 2 percent to 11 percent 
between 1963 and 1984. In contrast, the Japanese and EC export shares 
of the Philippine market fell in both of these periods. 
The country-region distribution of Philippine exports shows a de- 
creasing dependence on the United States as a trading partner. The 
share of the country’s exports sent to the United States declined from 
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Table 2.14 Structure of the Philippine’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 
1983 (percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
1960 10 86 1 0 3 
1978 14 52 6 2 26 
1983 13 36 7 5 38 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary & Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 15 10 5 36 34 
1978 8 21 7 27 37 
1983 8 27 5 21 39 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
47 percent in 1963 to 27 percent by 1980.9 In absolute terms, Philippine 
exports to the United States amounted to $1.8 billion in 1982, while 
imports from the United States were also valued at $1.8 billion in that 
year. The share of exports taken by Japan rose somewhat from 1963 
to 1980; the EC share remained about the same. The most important 
shift was the increase from 3 percent to 11 percent in the relative 
importance of the ADCs as an export market between these years. 
This may be due to trade diversion associated with the establishment 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), since ADC 
Singapore is an ASEAN member. Export shares of the other ASEAN 
members, the RRCs, remained roughly the same, however. 
The economic history of the Philippines over the last forty years and 
the present political turmoil do not give reason to expect the country 
to shift its development strategy in the foreseeable future and focus on 
becoming an outward-looking exporter of manufactured goods. Peri- 
odic attempts to liberalize can be expected, but the conflicting economic 
and political pressures within the country seem likely to result in the 
same pattern of on-again, off-again government controls on trade and 
development that has been seen over the last forty years. Yet, because 
of the richness of its human and physical resources, the Philippines is 
likely to continue to grow at a respectable rate. 
U.S. concerns with the Philippines go beyond the historically close 
political and economic relationships between the two countries. Clark 
Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base are the largest overseas 
Table 2.15 Distribution of the Philippine’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 
1970, 1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
European 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
and New Zealand 
Community 
Total 
46.4 46.6 30.3 42.7 34.3 26.6 38.6 
2.9 0.1 2.4 0.2 1.6 1 .o I .o 
22.1 28.0 38.0 40.5 29.1 32.7 24.5 
2.8 0.3 4.5 0.4 4.2 2. I 3.2 
17.4 21.7 17.7 8.7 14.0 20.6 11.8 
2.4 2.9 2.2 6.7 9.6 11.0 10.9 
- - 1 .o 5.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
5.6 0.0 - 4.6 0.4 6.9 4.6 4.3 
- - - - - - 
100.0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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American air and naval facilities, and they are generally regarded as 
vital to a U.S. military presence not only in the Pacific but also in the 
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. It would be a severe blow to U.S. 
military strategy if a Philippine government forced the United States 
to relinquish control over these bases. Since poor economic perfor- 
mance in the Philippine economy contributes to the possibility of such 
an outcome, the United States may wish to consider establishing closer 
economic ties with the Philippines, for example, by granting the country 
more favorable treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences 
or perhaps by negotiating a free trade arrangement with the country. 
Malaysia 
Trade and development policies. Peninsular Malaysia achieved po- 
litical independence in 1957; Sabah and Sarawak gained their indepen- 
dence and became part of Malaysia in 1963.1° Fortunately, Malaysia 
already had a per capita income that was considerably above the other 
three resource-rich countries. As in most developing countries, the 
Malaysian government began its industrialization endeavors with im- 
port substitution fostered by moderate levels of protection and gen- 
erous fiscal incentives, such as were provided in the Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance in 1958 and the broader Investment Incentive Act in 1968. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a deliberate effort was made to 
promote exports. This included permitting a double deduction from 
taxable income for export expenses and a further tax deduction based 
on Malaysian raw material and wage costs. Free-trade and export- 
processing zones, in which firms can freely import materials and capital 
goods used in export production, were also established in various parts 
of the country. Furthermore, the government provided low-cost export 
insurance, helped keep shipping rates low, and engaged in the pro- 
motion of Malaysian exports throughout the world. 
The country’s development efforts have been successful in achieving 
an impressive degree of diversification of both primary product and 
manufacturing activities. For example, palm oil and timber production 
has increased to the point that these sectors are now as important as 
the rubber and tin industries as earners of foreign exchange. Impressive 
processing activities have been established in the palm oil and rubber 
sectors. The oil and natural gas industries have also become major 
export-earning industries. In addition, textiles and apparel, electrical 
machinery, and, especially, electronics products have become impor- 
tant export items. As can be seen from table 2.16, exports of manu- 
factured products increased from 6 percent of total exports in 1960 to 
22 percent in 1983. 
Trade performance. The Malaysian import figures for 1963 seem un- 
reliable, due perhaps to its political union with Singapore in that year. 
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Table 2.16 Structure of Malaysia’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
6 1960 20 74 
1978 27 52 2 1 1  8 
1983 35 43 2 14 6 
- - 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 29 16 13 14 28 
1978 17 13 7 34 29 
1983 9 14 5 44 28 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
Subsequent data show a steady increase in the share of the Malaysian 
import market captured by the United States, this share rising from 11 
percent in 1970 to 16 percent by 1984 (table 2.17). Japan’s share in- 
creased significantly between these years, from 4 percent to 25 percent, 
while the EC’s share decreased significantly. Import trade with the 
ADCs also rose appreciably but dropped with the other RRCs. 
The country-region distribution of Malaysian exports indicates that 
the United States gradually increased its share between 1963 and 1980. l 1  
In 1982, Malaysia exported $1.8 billion worth of goods to the United 
States and imported $1.7 billion. Shipments to Japan, the ADCs, and 
the other RRCs remained about the same in share terms over the time 
period; those to the EC fell in relative importance. 
Malaysia has been successful in achieving an export-oriented indus- 
trialization strategy that is based on processing its abundant natural 
resources and on utilizing its abundant supply of low-cost labor. There 
seem to be no major reasons why this pattern will not continue, at least 
in the medium term. 
Thailand 
Trade and development policies. The modern industrialization efforts 
of the government of Thailand can be dated as beginning around 1960 
when a board of investment, set up to promote domestic investment 
with the use of tax incentives, was established (1959) and a new, mildly 
protective customs schedule put into effect (1960). l2  The government 
Table 2.17 Distribution of Malaysia’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1%3, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. - 
Canada 0.4 
Japan 4.4 
Australia 
and New Zealand 2.6 
European 
Community 16.7 
ADCs 66.4 
RRCs 9.2 
China - 
Total 100.0 
-
12.6 
2.0 
24.7 
2.5 
24.8 
28.8 
4.1 
0.1 
100.0 
10.7 
2.3 
3.6 
11.6 
42.4 
22.6 
6.6 
100.0 
- 
14.9 
2.2 
21.0 
3.0 
23.2 
30.3 
3.6 
1.4 
100.0 
-
14.4 
0.9 
23. I 
6.2 
15.7 
35.2 
4.3 
100.0 
- 
18.3 
0.5 
25.7 
2.0 
19.8 
27.9 
3.6 
I .8 
100.0 
15.6 
1.2 
24.8 
4.3 
11.8 
36.6 
3.7 
I .7 
100.0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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also influenced industrial expansion by means of entry controls and 
the use of preferential credit arrangements. The net effect was a de- 
velopment policy that to some extent favored manufacturing industries 
producing for the domestic market. 
With the passage of the Export Promotion Act in 1972, greater at- 
tention was given to the promotion of manufactured exports. Its pro- 
visions included exemption from paying import duties on imported 
materials used in production for export, exemption from business taxes 
on export-producing activities, and a Bank of Thailand discount facility 
at below-market rates for short-term export loans made by commercial 
banks. Since 1972, exporters are also eligible for a 20 percent rebate 
on electricity charges incurred in export production. The Department 
of Commerce began export-promoting activities in 1975. 
Beginning in 1974, as the sharp increase in the price of oil caused a 
deterioration in the country’s balance of payments, there was an in- 
crease in industrial import protection. Nominal protection on import- 
competing manufactured goods increased from 35 percent to 50 percent 
between 1974 and 1978 (World Bank 1980). Greater increases in busi- 
ness taxes on imports than on comparable domestic products, the im- 
position of import surcharges on certain products, and the increased 
use of import controls were other policies favoring import-substituting 
activities. The debt crisis of the early 1980s and a sharp deterioration 
in Thailand’s terms of trade brought about further import restrictions. 
Trade performance. Despite the somewhat contradictory nature of 
Thailand’s recent development policies, export growth has been very 
high in the last decade (table 2.2), with exports of textiles and apparel, 
machinery and equipment, and other manufactures continuing to make 
up an increasing share of the country’s total exports (table 2.18). 
As in a number of the other APR countries, the U.S. share of Thai- 
land’s imports from its major trading partners decreased between 1963 
and 1970 as Japan’s share increased (table 2.19). In the Thai case, 
however, these share changes were not as great as in the other cases. 
The pattern of a U.S. share gain and a Japanese loss in the 1970s, as 
the dollar depreciated, and the reverse of these changes in the 1980s, 
as the dollar appreciated, also took place in Thailand. The EC share 
in Thailand’s imports fell steadily throughout the period. The other 
important change in export shares was the increase in the ADCs’ share 
from 1 1  percent in 1963 to 22 percent in 1984. The share of the other 
RCCs in exports to Thailand remained about the same over the period. 
The share of Thailand’s exports absorbed by the United States rose 
significantly from 10 percent to 22 percent between 1963 and 1984. 
Shipments to the EC also increased between these years but only from 
23 percent to 27 percent. Thailand’s exports to the United States in 
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Table 2.18 Structure of Thailand’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
1960 7 91 0 0 2 
1978 1 1  64 10 3 12 
1983 6 62 I 1  6 15 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 10 1 1  1 1  25 43 
1978 4 21 9 31 35 
1983 4 24 8 29 35 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
1984 amounted to $1.2 billion and its imports from the United States 
to $1.0 billion. Japan’s share fell after 1970 from 30 percent to 17 
percent. Interestingly, Thai exports to other RRCs and the ADCs di- 
minished in relative importance over the entire period. 
The Thai government’s policy of modest intervention in the market 
economy seems likely to continue into the foreseeable future and result 
in high growth rates and a growing degree of export-oriented industrial 
diversification. 
Indonesia 
Trade and development policies. Indonesia has been the least suc- 
cessful of the resource-rich countries in shifting from an inward-looking 
policy that protects domestic producers of manufactured products from 
foreign competition to a strategy of promoting exports of manufac- 
t u r e ~ . * ~  The 8 percent share of manufactures in total exports in 1983 
(table 2.3) is much lower than that for the other three resource-rich 
countries. The unusual richness of its resources and especially its ability 
to take advantage in export markets of the sharp oil price increase in 
the 1970s may in part be responsible for this low manufacturing share 
by reducing the balance of payments pressures for the expansion of 
manufactured exports. 
Four separate periods can be distinguished since Indonesia achieved 
its independence in 1949: the period of constitutional democracy (1950- 
Table 2.19 Distribution of Thailand’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
u . s  18.7 9.6 14.8 15.0 19.1 15.3 15.7 22.4 
Canada 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.1 2.1 0.4 1.2 1.5 
Japan 34.6 25.6 44.9 29.5 33.6 18.9 36.7 17.0 
Australia 
and New Zealand 1.9 0.3 3.6 0.5 3.2 1.3 2.6 2.3 
European 
Community 28.7 22.9 24.3 22.2 18.0 32.6 15.9 26.9 
ADCs 11.6 26.3 9.6 23.1 18.8 18.0 22.2 19.2 
RRCs - 1.5 14.9 1.7 9.3 4.9 10.7 1.4 7.1 
- 2.4 3.8 3.1 China - - - - 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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57); the “guided democracy” of 1958-65; the liberalization of the ‘hew 
order” (1966-7 1); and developments up to the present after the period 
of liberalization (Pitt 1985). The first period saw sporadic attempts to 
dismantle the elaborate system of foreign exchange controls and import 
quotas that had existed under Dutch rule. But lobbying pressures on 
the government to grant preferential import privileges to the new class 
of indigenous importers and to monopolistic organizations of domestic 
industrial firms formed to import a common raw material tended to 
undermine these liberalization efforts. 
The second period, 1958-65, was marked by President Sukarno’s 
implementation of his concept of “guided democracy” under which 
there was an aversion to free markets and foreign capital. The tradi- 
tional Dutch trading houses were nationalized so that by 1959 only 20 
percent of the import trade remained in private hands. The government 
allocated all foreign exchange and, in doing so, favored inward-oriented 
state enterprises. Moreover, the government’s policy of allocating raw 
materials on the basis of a firm’s existing productive capacity encour- 
aged the expansion of capacity, though this capacity was underutilized; 
in 1965, manufacturing as a whole operated at only between 20 percent 
and 30 percent of capacity. 
The period 1966-7 1 was one of sweeping liberalization in Indonesia, 
beginning with a scheme to encourage exports that permitted exporters 
to sell a portion of their foreign exchange earnings at free market prices. 
The government ended the direct allocation of foreign exchange to 
manufacturing firms, and importers were permitted to buy almost any 
good they wished. Subsidies and preferential credit rates to state en- 
terprises were cut sharply. Another important change was the enact- 
ment of a law to encourage foreign investment by exempting firms that 
undertook priority investments from taxes on as much as 60 percent 
of their profits for up to six years. A unified exchange rate system was 
established in 1970. 
In the period immediately after the liberalization phase, the new 
government shifted back toward import substitution with the increased 
use of quantitative import controls, including the banning of imports 
of many consumer goods, an increase in tariffs, and the introduction 
of numerous regulations covering investment activities. In 1978, how- 
ever, the currency was devalued and an export certificate scheme was 
introduced that tended to subsidize exports of manufactured goods. 
This led to a significant percentage increase in such exports, though 
starting from a very low level. Nevertheless, the government’s policies 
are still biased toward capital-intensive, import-substituting activities 
and include cumbersome regulations that discourage exports of labor- 
intensive manufactures. 
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Trade performance. Unlike in the other countries analyzed, Indonesia’s 
structure of production has not shifted significantly toward export- 
oriented manufacturing. Only 7 percent of the country’s exports were 
manufactured goods in 1983 (table 2.20), while the share of fuels, min- 
erals, and metals in exports rose from 33 percent to 80 percent between 
1960 and 1983. 
The country-region composition of Indonesian imports (table 2.21) 
shows a rise in shares from both the United States and Japan between 
1963 and 1970 and a decline in the export shares of the ADCs, the 
RRCs, and the EC. In the 1970s the U S .  share fell and Japan’s in- 
creased, while in the 1980s their shares remained unchanged. In con- 
trast, the share of imports from the European community increased in 
the 1980s. Imports from the ADCs dropped sharply from 19 percent 
to 5 percent between 1963 and 1970 but remained roughly constant 
thereafter. 
Indonesian exports to both the United States and Japan rose signif- 
icantly in the 1970s, while exports to the EC and the ADCs fell ap- 
preciably during this period. Indonesian exports to the United States 
in 1984 amounted to $4.5 billion compared to imports of only $1.2 
billion. In the period of the 1980s covered in table 2.21, the pattern of 
Indonesian exports by country destination remained roughly the same. 
As in the Philippines, there seem to be no strong reasons to expect 
that Indonesia will change its development strategy from that of recent 
Table 2.20 Structure of Indonesia’s Merchandise Trade, 1960, 1978, and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
- - 1960 33 67 0 
1 1 1978 72 26 - 
1983 80 12 1 1 6 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1960 23 5 10 17 45 
1978 18 9 6 36 31 
1983 8 25 5 35 28 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
Table 2.21 Distribution of Indonesia’s Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 1980 1984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
European 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
and New Zealand 
Community 
Total 
21.8 
0.2 
20.7 
0.8 
29.2 
19.3 
7.6 
100.0 
- -
28.2 
1.7 
34.5 
3.9 
23.2 
5.2 
3 .0 
100.0 
- __ 
15.9 
0.0 
37.9 
3.9 
18.4 
20.8 
2.8 
0.0 
100.0 
-
17.3 
2.2 
42.8 
5.3 
22.3 
5.2 
4.6 
100.0 
- -
20.9 
0.1 
52.5 
2.1 
6.9 
15.9 
1.3 
100.0 
- -
16.8 
43.0 
3.1 , 
4.0 
26.8 
4.3 
0.6 
0.9 
100.0 
-
22.4 
0.2 
51.7 
2.4 
5.3 
15.9 
I .8 
0.0 
100.0 
-
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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years. Strong vested interests have been created that favor an inward- 
looking industrialization strategy, and they are likely to continue to 
prevail in the political decision-making process determining develop- 
ment policy into the foreseeable future. 
2.3.3 China 
Trade and Development Policies 
Undoubtedly, the developing country in the APR whose policies are 
of greatest potential significance to the United States and other com- 
petitors in the region is China.I4 The modernization reforms initiated 
in the late 1970s could eventually transform the Chinese economy into 
both a major competitor and market in the area and the world. But the 
possibility of a return to Maoist economic policies, involving autarky 
and a deemphasis on the acquisition of Western technology, cannot be 
ruled out. 
China’s current trade policies are aimed at increasing exports in order 
to pay for the capital equipment, intermediate inputs, and advanced 
technology needed for industrial and agricultural modernization. One 
means of stimulating exports has been the establishment of Special 
Export Zones in which Western know-how, managerial skills, and cap- 
ital can be combined in joint ventures with low-wage Chinese labor. 
As table 2.22 indicates, the share of exports of manufactures in total 
exports equaled 57 percent in 1983, with textiles and clothing being 
the most important export category. Among the country’s primary 
Table 2.22 Structure of China’s Merchandise Trade, 1978 and 1983 
(percentage distribution) 
Exports 
Fuels, Other Machinery 
Minerals, Primary Textiles and Transport Other 
and Metals Commodities and Clothing Equipment Manufactures 
1978 13 38 24 3 22 
1983 22 21 19 6 32 
Imports 
Other Machinery 
Primary and Transport Other 
Food Fuels Commodities Equipment Manufactures 
1978 17 0 43 18 22 
1983 15 1 18 19 47 
~~ 
Sources: World Development Report, 1981 and 1986. 
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product exports, crude petroleum and petroleum products have become 
increasingly important. 
Encouraged by government policy, foreign investment in China ex- 
ceeded $3.5 billion by 1985, but firms doing business in China face 
many difficulties, including arbitrary tax and tariff charges, inadequate 
supplies of skilled labor, poor transportation and communication fa- 
cilities, and the resistance of vested interests to the economic reforms. 
Trade Performance 
After U.S. trade with China opened up, the United States quickly 
became an important supplier, furnishing by 1980 about a quarter of 
China’s imports from its major market-oriented trading partners (table 
2.23). The U.S. share dropped to 18 percent by 1984, perhaps reflecting 
the overvalued dollar. Japan’s share rose from 11 percent in 1963 to 
43 percent by 1984, and the ADCs became more important as exporters 
to China over the period, whereas the shares of exports supplied by 
the EC and Australia and New Zealand declined between these years. 
Chinese export figures are only available for 1984 on the UNCTAD 
data tape. The 42 percent share going to Hong Kong indicates the 
importance of that colony as an entrepbt for China. Japan is the next 
largest recipient of Chinese goods at 27 percent, while the United States 
and the European Community each absorbed about 12 percent in 1984. 
In value terms, Chinese exports to and imports from the United States 
were $2.3 billion and $3.0 billion, respectively, in 1984. 
It seems much too early to predict, even in the medium term, what 
China’s future role in the world trading and foreign investment system 
will be. 
2.4 The Competitive Performance of the United States and Its 
Major Competitors in the APR Market 
In the preceding section the major country-region distribution of the 
imports and exports of each of the nine developing countries in the 
Asian Pacific rim was examined. As is apparent from this analysis, no 
single pattern emerges as to how well the United States has competed 
in the area. In three markets, Singapore, Malaysia, and China, the 
share of U.S. exports in total exports from the countries’ major trading 
partners was greater in 1984 than in 1963. In four countries, the Phil- 
ippines, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand, this export share de- 
clined but by six percentage points or less. In two countries, Korea 
and Taiwan, the U.S. share of exports dropped by more than ten per- 
centage points over the period. Interestingly, except for Hong Kong, 
Korea and Taiwan ship a larger proportion of their exports to the United 
States than do any other countries in the group. 
Table 2.23 Distribution of China's Imports from and Exports to Selected Countries or Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 I970 1980 I 984 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
European 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
and New Zealand 
Community 
Total 
0.0 
11.9 
18.5 
- 
10.1 
42.3 
26.5 
5.2 
35.5 
17.9 
5.5 
43.0 
12.1 
1.3 
26.9 
38.6 
29.1 
1.2 
0.3 
100.0 
- 
9.9 
33.8 
2.0 
1.6 
100.0 
- 
6.5 
19.0 
4.2 
2.7 
100.0 
- 
5. I 
17.4 
9.7 
1.1 
100.0 
-
- 
1.3 
11.5 
42.7 
3.9 
- 
100.0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
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In only two countries, Hong Kong and China, is there a more than 
5 percent decline in the U.S. export share between 1980 and 1984, 
when the dollar appreciated significantly. Indeed, the U.S. export share 
rose between these years in the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. 
During the 1970s, however, when the dollar depreciated against the 
major currencies, the U.S. share of the export market increased in 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. 
Furthermore, in all of these countries the share of exports supplied by 
the United States was higher in 1984 than in 1970. In four countries, 
Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, the U.S.  competitive 
position worsened between 1963 and 1970. (Data are not available for 
these two years for China and Malaysia.) 
Table 2.24 indicates the importance of developing countries of the 
APR as an export market for the United States. The shares of total 
U.S. exports going to the ADCs, the RRCs, and China all increased 
between 1968 and 1982, the combined share for all three rising from 
6.5 percent in 1968 to 13.1 percent in 1982. If one adds Japan’s share 
of U.S. exports to these figures, which increased between 1968 and 
1982 from 8.5 percent to 9.9 percent, the combined exports of the 
United States to the major developing and developed countries of the 
APR constituted 15.0 percent of all U.S. exports in 1968 and 23.0 
percent in 1982. There is no doubt that the Asian Pacific rim is becoming 
a major area of export interest to the United States. 
Table 2.24 Distribution of U.S. Exports to and Imports from Selected 
Regions, 1%8, 1975, and 1982 (in percentages) 
All Goods 
1968 1975 1982 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
South Asia 
European 
Other 
Japan 
Australia 
Canada 
Rest of world 
Community 
Western Europe 
and New Zealand 
3.7 3.4 4.6 5.7 7.1 9.3 
2.8 3.1 3.1 4.8 4.6 4.5 
- - 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.9 
3. I 1.2 2.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 
27.0 25.7 23.5 18.0 24.2 17.8 
4.6 4.2 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.2 
8.5 12.6 8.8 12.0 9.9 15.8 
2.9 1.4 2. I 1.4 2.6 I .2 
23.5 26.8 20.1 22.5 15.4 18.8 
23.9 21.6 31.9 31.6 30.3 27.8 
Source: Trade data bank of author 
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Table 2.25 examines the success in trade of the United States relative 
to its major competitors in the import markets of developing countries 
of the APR, not on an individual-country basis but in the ADCs and 
the RRCs, as groups of countries, and in China. The competitive record 
of the United States is shown to be a mixed one. The U.S. export 
share in the import market of the ADCs in the area remained at around 
20 percent between 1963 and 1984, being 20 percent in 1963, 18 percent 
in 1970, and 21 percent in both 1980 and 1984, whereas its share of the 
goods exported by the major suppliers to the four RRCs dropped stead- 
ily from 24 percent in 1963 to 16 percent in 1984.15 In contrast, after 
U.S. trade with China was opened, the U.S. share of the Chinese 
market rose to 27 percent by 1980, then declined to 18 percent in 1984. 
For the region as a whole, the trend in the U.S. export share was 
slightly upward, moving down from 21.6 percent in 1963 to 19.0 percent 
in 1970 but then rising to 23.5 percent in 1980 and remaining almost 
unchanged at 23.2 percent in 1984, despite the sharp appreciation of 
the dollar. The significance of this upward trend in export performance 
in the APR market can be appreciated by noting that the U.S. share 
in world exports declined between 1963 and 1984, falling from 14.6 
percent in 1963 to 13.6 percent in 1970 and 11.0 percent in 1980 and 
then rising slightly to 11.2 percent in 1984. 
The most successful competitor in the APR market was Japan. Its 
shares of total exports to the ADCs, the RRCs, and China from the 
countries listed in the first column of table 2.25 rose for all three be- 
tween 1963 and 1984. By 1984, Japan was their largest supplier, sup- 
plying 30 percent of the ADCs’ import market, 26 percent of the RRCs’ 
import market, and 43 percent of China’s imports from the countries 
listed. The main loser in competition for sales in these markets was 
the European Community; its export shares declined steadily in all 
three parts of the APR market over the twenty-one-year period. 
An important change in the markets of developing countries that is 
only beginning to be appreciated (e.g., see Ahmad 1985) is that the 
more advanced developing countries are beginning to be important 
suppliers of manufactured goods to other developing countries. This 
is occurring in the APR market. As table 2.25 shows, the export share 
of the ADCs in their own import market increased from 8 percent in 
1963 to 12 percent by 1984, while their export share in the RRCs’ 
market rose from 1 percent to 10 percent between these years. The 
less industrially advanced RRCs did not participate in this trend, how- 
ever; their shares to the ADCs and to other RRCs declined over the 
period. 
Another aspect of the growing importance of the market for inter- 
national goods in the developing countries of the APR is that total 
exports to these countries by the United States, Canada, Japan, Aus- 
Table 2.25 Shares of the United States and Selected Foreign Competitors in Exports to APR Countries (in percentages) 
~ ~ 
1963 1970 I 980a 1984a 
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China 
Total Exports From All Row Countries 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia and 
EC 
ADCsb 
RRCsb 
China 
New Zealand 
20 
1 
22 
24 
1 
21 
0 
18 
12 
18 
1 
33 
20 
2 
30 
0 
10 
42 
21 
1 
28 
16 
1 
26 
27 
5 
36 
21 
2 
30 
16 
1 
26 
18 
6 
43 
3 
17 
8 
29 
0 
2 
20 
23 
9 
0 
39 
29 
1 
0 
3 
14 
10 
21 
0 
5 
22 
15 
7 
0 
10 
39 
2 
2 
- 
3 
12 
12 
23 
0 
7 
19 
4 
3 
3 
11 
12 
11 
10 
3 
13 
35 
4 
2 
5 
17 
10 
1 
4 
14 
30 
8 
0 
Natural Resource-Intensive Exports from All Row CountriesC 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia and 
EC 
ADCsb 
RRCsb 
China 
New Zealand 
21 
1 
7 
22 
3 
7 
0 
26 
2 
20 
1 
13 
27 
2 
13 
0 
28 
9 
20 
2 
8 
13 
3 
7 
52 
12 
7 
23 
4 
10 
13 
3 
6 
28 
20 
11 
6 
7 
9 
49 
0 
3 
8 
34 
23 
0 
55 
14 
2 
0 
- 
5 
7 
8 
46 
0 
9 
10 
19 
20 
0 
27 
26 
5 
4 
5 
5 
13 
50 
0 
10 
5 
40 
22 
0 
15 
4 
3 
6 
9 
6 
13 
24 
11 
8 
5 
47 
12 
6 
19 
11 
7 
4 
Labor-Intensive Exports from All Row CountriesC 
U.S. 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia and 
EC 
ADCsb 
RRCsb 
China 
New Zealand 
11 
0 
49 
1 
21 
13 
5 
0 
20 0 
0 0 
33 35 
0 0 
8 59 
31 6 
2 0 
0 - 
6 
0 
53 
1 
12 
26 
2 
0 
13 0 
0 0 
31 40 
1 0 
13 60 
33 2 
3 0 
0 - 
1 
0 
42 
1 
12 
21 
10 
0 
1 22 
1 0 
23 41 
1 1 
8 8 
56 21 
4 2 
0 - 
5 
0 
31 
1 
9 
18 
4 
32 
7 
1 
24 
1 
8 
54 
4 
2 
6 
0 
31 
0 
4 
5 1  
1 
Technology-Intensive Exports from All Row CountriesC 
U.S. 23 30 0 24 20 0 21 22 15 25 20 22 
Canada I 0 0 0 2 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 
Japan 35 23 32 43 34 56 39 32 50 40 32 44 
Australia and 
New Zealand 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
EC 33 32 68 23 33 44 1 1  20 30 15 17 23 
ADCsb 2 12 0 6 8 0 8 22 5 11 28 9 
RRCsb 5 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 4 1 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 - - - - 
Table 2.25 (continued) 
1963 1970 1980a 1984a 
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China 
Human-Capital-Intensive Exports from All Row CountriesC 
U.S. 14 
Canada 0 
Japan 47 
Australia and 
New Zealand 2 
EC 26 
ADCsb 4 
RRCsb 7 
China 0 
17 
I 
41 
1 
24 
16 
1 
0 
0 
0 
43 
6 
51 
0 
0 
9 
0 
59 
3 
16 
9 
3 
0 
9 
0 
50 
6 
18 
16 
1 
0 
0 
0 
71 
0 
29 
0 
0 
9 
1 
63 
3 
13 
8 
3 
0 
4 
1 
51 
3 
11 
28 
2 
0 
4 
2 
70 
5 
17 
1 
1 
9 
0 
59 
1 
16 
7 
2 
4 
3 
1 
47 
2 
13 
32 
1 
I 
1 
0 
79 
2 
15 
2 
0 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
Nore: Figures represent shares of total exports of countries listed 
aData for Taiwan are not included in the 1980 and 1984 figures since the United Nations no longer recognizes Taiwan as a separate country; 
therefore U.N. agencies no longer collect data on Taiwan. 
bThe shares of the ADCs and RRCs in their own regions measure trade within these regions. 
CThe commodity breakdown into goods that are natural-resource-intensive, unskilled-labor-intensive, technology-intensive, and human-capital- 
intensive is adapted from Krause 1982. 
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tralia, New Zealand, the European Community, as well as by the coun- 
tries of the region to each other amounted to 2.97 percent of world 
exports in 1963, 3.56 percent in 1970, 4.74 percent in 1980, and 5.85 
percent in 1984. 
Changes in the commodity composition of U.S. exports to the ADCs, 
the RRCs, and China between 1968 and 1982 are indicated in the first 
part of table 2.26. The comparative advantage of the United States in 
agricultural products and high-technology goods is evident. As would 
be expected, agricultural imports are more important for the resource- 
scarce ADCs and China than for the RRCs. For both the ADCs and 
the RRCs, exports of machinery have grown significantly in relative 
importance over the period, from 21 percent for the ADCs in 1963 to 
34 percent in 1982 and from 30 percent to 49 percent for the RRCs 
between these years. The relative decline in exports to China of ma- 
chinery between 1975 and 1982 may reflect special circumstances. An- 
other commodity class that gained somewhat in relative importance 
over the period is chemicals, whereas transportation equipment declined. 
Further insight into which categories of goods the competitors in the 
APR market have been successful in exporting can be gained by uti- 
lizing Krause’s (1982) breakdown of goods into four groups: natural- 
resource-intensive, unskilled-labor-intensive, technology-intensive, and 
human-capital-intensive. Table 2.25 divides the exports to the APR 
region of the United States and its competitors to the region into these 
four categories. As would be predicted under the factor-proportion 
theory of international trade, the commodity groups in which the United 
States has the largest market share are natural-resource-intensive and 
technology-intensive goods. In trade with the ADCs, the U.S. export 
share increased modestly over the 1963-84 period for both types of 
goods. For the RRCs, the U.S. export share declined for natural re- 
source products-a not unexpected result-and also for technology- 
intensive products, though less than in the other product categories. 
U.S. performance in the import market of the APR countries declined, 
as expected, for labor-intensive products and also, rather surprisingly, 
for human-capital-intensive products. As table 2.27 indicates, the fast- 
est growing category of exports to ADCs and RRCs was, except for 
the 1980-84 period, technology-intensive goods. The United States is 
in the fortunate position of specializing in commodities for which mar- 
ket demand is growing rapidly. 
Another picture of the nature of the U.S. exports, utilizing the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1976) breakdown of all goods into those 
that are technology-intensive and non-technology-intensive, is pre- 
sented in table 2.28. The analytical framework behind this division 
emphasizes temporary differences among countries in developing and 
introducing new technological knowledge as the basis for differences 
Table 2.26 Distribution of Major U.S. Exports to and Imports from APR Countries, 1968, 1975, and 1982 (in 
percentages) 
1968 1975 1982 
SIC Industries ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China 
Exports 
Agricultural- 
crops (1) 
Food and kindred 
products (20) 
Lumber and wood 
products (24) 
Chemicals 
Primary metal 
industries (33) 
Fabricated metal 
products (34) 
Machinery, exc. 
electrical (35) 
Electrical and electronic 
machinery (36) 
Transportation 
equipment (37) 
All other 
products 
23 14 - 26 1 1  28 18 10 51 
9 13 7 - 2 0 5 3 1 
1 
8 
0 
8 
0 
- 7 
- 0 
12 
0 
2 
1 
10 
0 
1 1  
7 
22 
2 2 3 - 5 19 2 2 3 
7 4 4 - 4 13 5 4 0 
13 
9 
13 
24 - 16 29 30 18 22 5 
6 
13 
14 
- 10 
- 17 
9 
1 16 
7 
27 
9 
22 
2 
1 
6 
1 
8 16 13 - 18 15 11 
Imports 
Agricultural- 
crops (1) 0 15 - 0 2 5 0 3 1 
Agricultural- 
livestock (2) 
Forestry (8) 
Oil and gas (13) 
Food and kindred 
products (20) 
Textile 
products (22) 
Apparel (23) 
Lumber and wood 
products (24) 
Chemicals (28) 
Petroleum 
products (29) 
Rubber and misc. 
plastic 
products (30) 
Leather and leather 
products (31) 
Primary metal 
industries (33) 
Electrical and 
electronic 
machinery (36) 
Miscellaneous 
mfg. (39) 
All other 
products 
1 
1 
0 
4 
10 
26 
10 
0 
0 
6 
2 
0 
16 
7 
7 
0 
0 
0 
4 
8 
24 
5 
0 
1 
6 
3 
3 
23 
9 
14 
0 
7 
41 
17 
1 
3 
2 
0 
5 
0 
0 
6 
10 
1 
5 
6 
0 
0 
4 
22 
7 
3 
12 
0 
0 
1 
29 
1 
3 
7 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
22 
2 
0 
1 
4 
10 
4 
23 
11 
19 
0 
5 
30 
7 
1 
6 
2 
. o  
3 
0 
1 
3 
30 
2 
7 
I 
0 
8 
5 
10 
28 
3 
6 
18 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
8 
Source: Trade data bank of author. 
Note: An industry is included if the export or import share of the industry is at least 5 percent in any region in any of 
the three years. 
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Table 2.27 Comparative Growth Rates by Factor-Intensity Breakdowns of 
Exports to APR Countries, 1963-70, 1970-80, and 1980-84 
(average annual growth rates in percentages) 
ADCs RRCs China 
1963- 1970 
Natural-resource-intensive 
Unskilled-labor-intensive 
Technology-intensive 
Human-capital-intensive 
1970 - 80 
Natural-resource-intensive 
Unskilled-labor-intensive 
Technology-intensive 
Human-capital-intensive 
1980-84 
Natural-resource-intensive 
Unskilled-labor-intensive 
Technology-intensive 
Human-capital-intensive 
18.6 
35.2 
36.8 
27.7 
72.5 
37.9 
91.6 
76.5 
- 1.3  
21.6 
7.8 
0.5 
9.8 
4.8 
18.3 
17.9 
74.8 
43.3 
82.7 
62.0 
-0.5 
4.3 
2.7 
-2 .2 
4.9 
17.3 
45.1 
15.6 
97.3 
168.3 
107.0 
56.6 
-5.7 
17.4 
11.5 
12.7 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
Note: Exports are from the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, 
the European community, the ADCs, the RRCs, and China. 
among countries in the commodity composition of trade. Though not 
always explicit, the ability to create new technology and undertake 
innovation depends, in turn, on there being high levels of research and 
managerial skills. The table shows that over the 1968-82 period, the 
United States has shifted the composition of its exports to every coun- 
try or region toward high-tech goods. Imports from every region have 
also moved in this direction, but the percentage by which technology- 
intensive exports to the world by the United States exceed technology- 
intensive imports was still about the same in 1982 as in 1968. 
Consistent with the factor-proportion theory, table 2.25 shows that 
the main U.S. competitor in the APR, Japan, gained market-share 
position over the period in the ADCs, the RRCs, and China in tech- 
nology-intensive and human-capital-intensive goods, while it lost in the 
labor-intensive category. The EC lost in every category between 1963 
and 1984. In contrast, the ADCs gained in export shares within their 
own market in every category, registering an especially impressive gain 
in the high-technology group. 
A technique developed by Hilton (1983) provides still another means 
of revealing the comparative cost position of the United States vis-a- 
vis the countries of the Asian Pacific rim. It involves regressing the 
ratio of U.S. exports to U.S.  imports to a country by commodity on 
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Table 2.28 Composition of U.S. Exports to and Imports from Selected 
Regions by Technology Intensity, 1968, 1975, and 1982 (in 
percentages) 
1968 1975 1982 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Technology-intensive goods 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
South Asia 
European Community 
Japan 
Australia and New Zealand 
Canada 
World 
38 15 41 26 42 27 
24 0 40 25 52 54 
- - 86 94 47 96 
30 0 42 1 42 4 
42 13 51 17 47 20 
32 26 33 25 37 30 
41 11 40 21 41 29 
19 4 16 5 23 11 
31 13 31 16 37 20 
Non-technology-intensive goods 
ADCs 62 
RRCs 76 
China - 
South Asia 70 
European Community 58 
Japan 68 
Australia and New Zealand 59 
Canada 81 
World 69 
85 
100 
100 
87 
74 
89 
96 
87 
- 
59 
60 
86 
58 
59 
67 
59 
85 
69 
74 58 73 
75 48 46 
94 47 96 
99 58 96 
83 53 80 
75 63 70 
79 59 71 
95 77 89 
84 63 80 
Source: Trade data bank of author. 
the cost shares of capital, unskilled labor, skilled labor, land, and other 
natural resources in the individual commodities. The coefficients on 
the various factor shares are a measure of the differences in relative 
factor prices between the United States and the other country. If, for 
example, the coefficient on a particular factor is positive, this implies 
that the relative price of the factor is lower in the United States than 
in the other country. A negative sign means that the factor is relatively 
cheaper in the other country and, thus, that the other country has a 
comparative advantage in producing goods in which that factor con- 
stitutes a relatively large proportion of production costs. 
The results of regressing bilateral export-import ratios for the United 
States and the countries of the APR for (in most cases) over two 
hundred commodities on a fivefold division of factor shares for these 
commodities are presented in table 2.29. For all the countries listed, 
the United States has a relative factor-price advantage in skilled labor 
and a disadvantage in unskilled labor. Furthermore, for all countries 
except Indonesia (and that coefficient is not significant at the 10 percent 
level or better), the United States has a comparative factor-price ad- 
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Table 2.29 Estimated Order of Relative Factor-Price Differences between the 
United States and Selected Countries or Regions, 1978 
Unskilled Skilled Natural # Obser- 
Capital Labor Labor Land Resources vations 
Singapore 4.23 
(2.88) 
Hong Kong 4.39 
(3.07) 
Taiwan 3.10 
(2.07) 
Korea 3.76 
(2.42) 
Malaysia 7.56 
(2.92) 
Thailand 2.49 
(1.19) 
Phillippines 2.39 
(1.25) 
Indonesia - .05 
( -  .02) 
All 4.26 
(3.30) 
ASEAN 3.35 
(2.26) 
China .47 
( . I ] )  
Japan 5.42 
(4.57) 
-3.50 
( -  2.97) 
-5.39 
(-5.02) 
-9.40 
(-8.25) 
-8.52 
(- 6.98) 
- 6.36 
(-3.31) 
- 6.33 
( -4.03) 
- 5.36 
( -  3.71) 
- 4.92 
( -  2.86) 
-6.81 
( -6.55) 
-4.30 
(-3.68) 
- 6.45 
( - 1.96) 
-4.12 
(-4.30) 
4.81 
(3.11) 
4.63 
(3.12) 
6.99 
(4.68) 
7.63 
(4.86) 
4.44 
(1.81) 
10.29 
(4.82) 
10.03 
(4.78) 
13.27 
(4.77) 
5.67 
(4.07) 
6.69 
(4.26) 
10.84 
(2.82) 
- 1.92 
(-1.51) 
- .96 
( -  .22) 
14.88 
(3.47) 
10.74 
(3.15) 
4.05 
(1.03) 
-9.36 
(-1.70) 
-4.34 
( -  .96) 
- 2.97 
( -  .61) 
- 12.52 
( -  2.75) 
8.45 
(2.64) 
-5.51 
(-1.36) 
5.45 
(.89) 
18.29 
(6.04) 
-89.61 
(~ 2.02) 
9.71 
( . W  
121.80 
(2.55) 
116.26 
(2.37) 
- 128.82 
( -  1.48) 
14.50 
(-.14) 
- .04 
(.02) 
- 201.86 
( - 2.27) 
-7.50 
( - . I@ 
-92.68 
( -  2.00) 
- 183.90 
(-1.22) 
130.50 
(3.18) 
203 
240 
240 
236 
139 
157 
193 
109 
274 
242 
89 
28 1 
Source: Trade data bank of author. 
Note: The t-statistic is in parentheses under each coefficient. A t-statistic of 1.67 is 
significant at 10 percent. 
vantage in physical capital. As expected, the United States has a com- 
parative advantage in land-intensive and natural-resource-intensive 
products vis-a-vis Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea. The land coefficient 
has the wrong (but not significant) sign for Singapore, while the negative 
sign on the natural resource coefficient reflects Singapore exports of 
refined petroleum. 
The four resource-rich countries, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philip- 
pines, and Indonesia, all have a factor-price advantage in both land 
and natural resources relative to the United States. The U.S. trade 
pattern with Japan reveals that the United States has a relative factor- 
price advantage in natural resources, land, and capital and a disad- 
vantage in unskilled labor. Interestingly, though not quite significant at 
the 10 percent level, the coefficient on skilled labor indicates that Japan 
has a comparative price advantage in this factor, too. 
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2.5 Export Performance of the Developing Countries of the APR 
Although this paper is primarily concerned with the performance of 
the United States and its competitors in the APR market, data have 
also been collected on the performance of the developing countries of 
the region in the markets of the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand, the European Community, and in the region itself. 
Analysis of the trade of the individual countries in section 2.3 revealed 
that every country except the Philippines shipped a larger proportion 
of its exports to the United States at the end of the period covered 
(usually 1984) than in the beginning (usually 1963). In most cases the 
increase was very significant. In contrast, the share of exports from 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand to Japan declined over 
the period, while the export shares from Hong Kong and Malaysia to 
Japan remained unchanged. Only the export shares of Indonesia and 
Singapore to Japan rose. The share of exports taken by the EC declined 
for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, remained about the same for 
Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and increased for Korea and 
Thailand. 
In value terms, the ADCs had a very large trade surplus with the 
United States in 1984, with exports of $23.1 billion and imports of only 
$16.7 billion. In contrast, the RRCs’ exports to and imports from the 
United States in 1984 both equaled $5.7 billion. 
The relative position of the APR countries as sources of imports for 
the United States is given in table 2.24. The developing countries of 
the region supplied 6.5 percent of all U.S. imports in 1968, 10.7 percent 
in 1968, and 14.7 percent in 1982. The share of the ADCs in these 
figures rose from 53 percent in 1975 to 63 percent in 1982. Adding 
Japan’s import share to the shares of the developing countries brings 
the figures to 19.1 percent, 22.7 percent, and 30.5 percent, respectively, 
in the three years. However, as table 2.30 indicates, although the de- 
veloping countries of the APR (excluding China) significantly increased 
their share of total exports directed to the United States between 1963 
and 1970, this proportion decreased slightly between 1970 and 1984. 
The U.S. export share to the developing countries of the APR rose 
6.5 percentage points between 1968 and 1982, while the U.S. import 
share from these countries increased 8.2 percentage points. The U.S. 
export share to Japan rose 1.2 percentage points, and the U.S. import 
share from Japan rose 3.2 percentage points in the same period. 
The most important category of imports into the United States from 
the ADCs and China is textiles and apparel (table 2.26). The proportion 
that these goods make up of total U.S. imports from the ADCs is 
declining, but textiles and apparel have become more important in U.S. 
imports from China. Oil and gas was the main import from the RRCs 
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Table 2.30 Distribution of Total Exports of APR Countries to the United 
States and Other Selected Countries and Regions, 1963, 1970, 
1980, and 1984 (in percentages) 
1963 1970 
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China 
United States 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia and New Zealand 
EC 
ADCs 
RRCs 
China 
Total 
18.5 19.0 
1.7 0.8 
11.2 20.9 
3.8 1.1 
23.8 18.9 
12.3 31.6 
28.1 7.2 
0.3 0.0 
100.0 100.0 
- -  
37.0 17.9 
2.8 0.7 
11.9 25.0 
2.8 1.7 
18.2 14.6 
15.1 33.8 
11.3 5.5 
0.5 0.4 
100.0 100.0 
- -  
1980 1984 
ADCs RRCs China ADCs RRCs China 
United States 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia and New Zealand 
EC 
ADCs 
RRCs 
Total 
24.6 
1.7 
10.5 
3.7 
18.9 
16.7 
22.1 
100.0 
-
16.4 
0.3 
31.8 
1.6 
12.3 
31.0 
5.6 
100.0 
- 34.4 
- 2.4 
- 10.9 
2.8 
- 13.4 
- 14.2 
- 19.2 
100.0 
- 
-  
18.7 12.1 
0.4 1.3 
36.8 26.9 
2.0 1.3 
8.4 11.5 
27.9 42.7 
4.9 3.9 
100.0 100.0 
~- 
Source: UNCTAD trade data tape. 
in the early part of the period covered, but by 1982 the 30 percent 
share for this category was matched by a 30 percent share for imports 
of electrical and electronic machinery. Electrical and electronic prod- 
ucts are also an important category of imports from the ADCs. 
The change in composition of U.S. imports from the APR developing 
countries toward more complex products such as electrical and elec- 
tronic machinery is also apparent from table 2.28 ,  which divides all 
imports into technology-intensive and non-technology-intensive goods. 
As this table indicates, imports from all the countries or regions listed 
are becoming more technology-intensive. 
2.6 Direct Investment in the APR Countries 
Achieving a market position abroad by means of direct foreign in- 
vestment, in addition to exporting goods, has become an increasingly 
important element in corporate strategy over the last twenty-five years. 
Table 2.31 indicates the extent to which U.S. and Japanese companies 
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Table 2.31 Outstanding Direct Investment, 1980 (millions of dollars) 
Country of 
Investment 
Investment by 
United States 
Investment by 
Japan 
Japan 
United States 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
ASEAN: Subtotal 
ADMEa Subtotal 
World Total 
6,274 
587 
510 
1,969 
1,334 
618 
1,244 
1,196 
360 
4,752 
7,818 
2 13,460 
8,878 
1,137 
370 
1,095 
4,424 
650 
615 
936 
396 
7,021 
9,623 
36,497 
Source: Patrick, 1983. 
aAdvanced developing market economies. 
have pursued this strategy in the APR countries. Although total Jap- 
anese direct investment in the ADCs and RRCs combined is nearly $2 
billion more than U.S. investment, American investment in the ADCs 
is greater than Japan’s, $4.2 billion versus $3.5 billion. In view of 
Japan’s lack of natural resources, it is to be expected that Japanese 
direct investment in the RRCs is greater. Japanese investment in oil- 
rich Indonesia alone amounted to 46 percent of its total investment in 
the region. Korea and Hong Kong were Japan’s next most important 
direct investment markets. Hong Kong, followed by Indonesia and the 
Philippines, was the most important U.S. investment market in the 
area. 
Tables 2.32-2.35 provide additional information on U.S. direct in- 
vestment. Tables 2.32 and 2.33 indicate the share of total U.S. direct 
investment received by individual APR countries and industries in these 
countries. U.S. direct investment in the APR is a small but rapidly 
growing proportion of total U.S. direct investment, with the share of 
total U.S. direct investment rising from 3.6 percent in 1977 to 6.7 
percent in 1984. The shares in each country except the Philippines 
increased between these years. The most important APR countries for 
U.S. foreign direct investment in 1977 (and, as seen from table 2.31, 
also in 1980) were, in order of relative importance, Hong Kong, In- 
donesia, and the Philippines; in 1984 the rank order was Indonesia, 
Hong Kong, and the Philippines/Malaysia. 
U.S. investment in the region is focused more on the primary and 
service sectors than on manufacturing, which absorbed only 3.6 percent 
of total U.S. manufacturing investment abroad in 1984, whereas the 
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Table 2.32 Country Shares of All U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in an 
Industry, 1977 (percentage) 
Mach. 
Prim. exc. 
All Total Metal Elect. Elect. 
Country Industries Mining Petr. Mfg. Food Chem. Fab. Eqpt. Eqpt. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
0.7 
0.3 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
0.9 
a a 2.6 0.2 0.0 0.3 h 0.2 
0.1 a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 
1.0 0.5 1.8 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.6 
0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.8 
0. I a 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
0.0 a 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.0 a 0.3 
0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.6 
0.0 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.4 a 0.1 1.1 
Fin an c e 
Transp. Other Bank- exc. Other 
E m .  Mfg. Trade ing Banking Industries 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
h 
h 
0.0 
b 
0.1 
h 
a 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
a 
0.1 
0.5 
0.4 
a 
a 
a 
0.1 
2.2 
0.2 
0.2 
2.1 
1.1 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 
3.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.8 
a 
0.2 
0.7 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
2.5 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1981. 
asuppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
hlndicates an amount between-$500,000 and + $500,000. 
shares were 8.7 percent for petroleum, 10.7 percent for banking, 6.4 
percent for trade, and 4.7 percent for banking. Indonesia and Malaysia 
were the major countries in which petroleum investments were un- 
dertaken. Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines were important 
as host countries for U.S. investment in service activities. 
Table 2.34 and 2.35 show the industry distribution of U.S. direct 
investment in each country in 1977 and 1984. Except for Indonesia, 
there has been a relative shift away from investment in primary-product 
sectors and toward manufacturing and/or service activities. In Korea 
and Taiwan the relative importance of U.S. manufacturing investment 
declined between 1977 and 1984, perhaps reflecting their advancing 
industrialization. The share of investment in manufacturing increased 
significantly in Malaysia and Singapore and remained about the same 
in Hong Kong and the Philippines. Service activities investment in- 
creased in relative terms in Korea, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. 
133 U.S. and Foreign Competition in the APR Developing Countries 
Table 2.33 Country Shares of All U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in an 
Industry, 1984 (percentage) 
Mach. 
Prim. exc. 
All Total Metal Elect. Elect. 
Country Industries Mining Petr. Mfg. Food Chem. Fab. Eqpt. Eqpt. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thai 1 and 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
1.9 a 6.1 
0.5 0.0 1.1 
0.5 0.0 a 
1 .o 0.0 0.8 
0.4 0.2 d 
0.4 0.0 a 
0.4 0.0 0.2 
1.6 0.0 0.5 
0.2 0.1 0.2 
0.4 a 0.1 
0.5 1.1 0.8 
1.1 a 0.5 
a 0.0 0.2 
0.2 0.5 0.0 
0.5 0.2 0.6 
0.7 0.2 0.7 
Transp. Other 
Eqpt. Mfg. 
Bank- 
Trade ing 
a 0.0 0.3 
0.1 a 3.1 
0.4 0.0 a 
1.2 a 5.2 
a 1.0 
a 1.8 
0.9  a 2.0 
a 0.0 a 
a 
a 
Finance 
exc . Other 
Banking Industries 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
0.0 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0.3 
0.2 
0.0 
a 
0.2 
a 
a 
a 
0.1 
a 
a 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
1 .o 
0.2 
0.4 
0.4 
3.7 
0.2 
0.1 
2.0 
1.6 
0.4  
1.6 
0.9 
3.9 
0.0 
a 
a 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 
4.2 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0.8 
a 
a 
0.1 
4.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1981. 
asuppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
2.7 Conclusion 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the 
economic performance of the United States and its competitors in the 
developing countries of the Asian Pacific rim, defined to include Sin- 
gapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thai- 
land, Indonesia, and China. First, and perhaps most important, is that 
the APR is a rapidly growing, though still small, international market 
for goods and services and foreign direct investment. Exports to the 
countries of the region by their major trading partners, defined as the 
United States, Canada, Japan, the European community, Australia and 
New Zealand, and the APR countries themselves, amounted to 3.0 
percent of total world exports in 1963 and 5.8 percent in 1984. The 
share of total U.S. exports going to the APR has risen from 6.5 percent 
in 1968 to 13.1 percent in 1982. If Japan’s share of U.S. exports is 
added to these figures, the share of U.S. exports taken by the devel- 
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Table 2.34 Industry Distribution of a Country’s Total Direct Investment from 
the United States, 1977 (percentage) 
~~ 
Mach. 
exc. 
Total Prim. Elect. Elect. 
Country Mining Petr. Mfg. Food Chem. Metal Eqpt. Eqpt. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
0.9 74.8 9.9 0.2 3.0 a 0.0 
0.0 d 18.5 0.6 3.2 0.4 0.9 
0.0 32.6 37.9 11.9 10.5 1.7 0.1 
0.0 45.0 20.5 1.0 0.6 5.4 2.9 
2.5 d 21.5 3.8 3.8 1.7 0.0 
0.0 41.5 2.0 22.8 0.3 
0.0 6.2 68.7 3.5 19.7 0.4 1.2 
0.0 20.4 15.1 0.4 3.8 a 1.2 
1.3 
9.9 
4.1 
8.7 
4.6 
4.3 
34.0 
4.4 
Finance Other 
Transp. Other Bank- exc. Indus- 
Eqpt. Mfg. Trade ing Banking tries 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
0.0 
a 
a 
0.2 
0.0 
2.7 
0.0 
a 
~ ______ 
a 0.9 0.8 0.5 
3.2 a 1.7 0.4 3.0 
a 9.1 11.1 3.1 6.2 
1.7 14.5 9.5 3.5 7.2 
7.6 a 11.4 2.5 3.4 
1.3 a 4.3 2.8 2.3 
6.9 8.5 13.9 1.9 0.8 
a 28.2 10.0 12.3 13.9 
~ ~~ 
Source; U.S. Department of Commerce 1981. 
aSupprehsed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
oped and developing countries of the APR increased from 15.0 percent 
in 1968 to 23.0 percent in 1982. 
The United States has performed quite well in competing with the 
other major trading partners (defined as in the preceding paragraph) of 
the APR countries. The U.S. export share of this market rose from 
21.6 percent in 1963 to 23.5 percent in 1980 and remained at 23.2 percent 
in 1984, despite the appreciation of the dollar relative to the currencies 
of Japan, the countries of the European Community, and other U.S. 
competitors in the region after 1980. Within the region, the U.S. gained 
slightly in market share in the markets of the ADCs (defined as Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), moving from 20 percent in 1963 
to 21 percent in 1984, but lost in the RRCs (defined as the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia), falling from a 24 percent share in 
1963 to a 16 percent share in 1984. In the Chinese market the United 
States had no market position in 1963, but by 1984 the U.S. share of 
China’s imports from its major trading partners was 18 percent. 
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Table 2.35 Industry Distribution of a Country’s Total Direct Investment from 
the United States, 1984 (percentage) 
Mach. 
Prim. exc. 
Total Metal Elec. Elec. 
Country Mining Petr. Mfg. Food Chem. Fab. Eqpt. Eqpt. 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
a 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
1.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
88.3 3.4 
62.4 32.1 
a 37.4 
24.0 45.4 
a 25.6 
12.8 56.0 
9.2 16.6 
a 
0.3 
8.8 
0.2 
5.7 
1.9 
0.5 
a 
0.9 a 
2.5 0.8 
15.0 1.9 
4.3 3.4 
4.8 a 
1.1 a 
15.6 0.0 
3.8 1.4 
0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0.6 
23.2 
20.4 
10.2 
19.9 
4.7 
a 
Tramp. Other 
Eqpt. Mfg. 
Trade 
Bank- Finance 
ing exc. 
Banking 
Other 
Indus- 
tries 
Indonesia 0.0 a 1.2 0.7 0.2 a 
Malaysia a 3.6 8.3 1.6 a a 
Philippines a a 4.6 22.0 a 
Singapore a a 13.7 9.4 3.2 4.3 
Thailand 0.0 a 7.9 5.7 0.2 a 
Korea 3.5 2.6 13.2 26.1 a a 
Taiwan 3. I a 14.5 13.8 0.7 2.2 
Hong Kong 0.0 a 30.0 13.5 15.7 15.1 
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1985, Q .  36. 
asuppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
The major competitor of the United States in the region is Japan. In 
1984 Japan’s share of the ADCs’ market was 30 percent compared to 
the U.S. share of 21 percent, and the Japanese share of the RRCs’ 
market was 26 percent compared to the U.S. share of 16 percent in 
that year. Japan supplied 43 percent of China’s imports from its major 
trading partners in 1984, whereas the United States supplied only 18 
percent. 
Japan has also been the most successful competitor over the period 
in terms of gains in market shares. In 1963, for example, the U.S. and 
Japanese shares of imports into the ADCs and RRCs from their main 
trading partners were about the same, whereas, as noted above, the 
1984 Japanese market shares exceeded the U.S. shares by about ten 
percentage points. The biggest loser in the competition for market 
shares has been the European Community. The EC’s shares of the 
market for foreign goods in the ADCs and RRCs were only slightly 
below those of Japan and the United States in 1963, but they are now 
below the ADCs as supplier to the ADCs themselves and to the RRCs. 
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The rapid growth in the market shares achieved by the ADCs is one 
of the most important developments in the area. These countries are 
beginning to supply an increasing proportion of the market for man- 
ufactured goods in the APR. China, too, is now taking an appreciable 
part of this market. 
The various methods used to reveal the comparative advantage po- 
sition of the United States in the region indicate, as would be predicted 
from the factor-proportion theory of international trade, that the United 
States has a competitive advantage in commodities utilizing relatively 
large capital and skilled-labor factor shares. Furthermore, in the re- 
source-scarce ADCs, the United States has a comparative advantage 
in land-intensive and other natural-resources-intensive commodities. 
The United States tends to be at a disadvantage in producing labor- 
intensive goods in the entire market and in providing land-intensive 
and natural-resource-intensive goods in the RRCs. 
One observes the results of these basic factor conditions in the com- 
modity composition of U.S. exports to the region. They tend to be 
concentrated in natural resource-intensive goods such as agricultural 
products and in technology-intensive goods, which, in turn, require a 
relatively high supply of professional and managerial skills to market 
successfully. Furthermore, the United States is competing most suc- 
cessfully against its export rivals in the APR market in high-technology 
products and, to some extent, natural-resource-intensive commodities. 
One would expect this pattern to continue, though it must be recognized 
that not only Japan but the ADCs and RRCs are shifting into the high- 
tech area. The United States must continually upgrade its level of high- 
tech products to maintain its market positions in the APR market as 
well as in other world markets. 
Market opportunities for the United States depend on economic and 
political conditions in the countries of the region as well as on U.S. 
competitive abilities. It appears that the existing ADC governments 
will continue to pursue export-oriented economic policies. However, 
there is some political uncertainty stemming from outside pressures in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and from both outside and inside pressures 
in Korea. It is conceivable but unlikely that these pressures could bring 
governmental changes that reduce market opportunities in these coun- 
tries. Even with the present governments in Korea and Taiwan, there 
is a need for the United States to apply pressures for the removal of 
various import barriers. 
There is considerable political uncertainty in another important mar- 
ket for U.S.  goods, the Philippines. One would expect economic pol- 
icies to continue as they have, with alternate cycles of liberalization 
and control, resulting in a moderate rate of growth. But, there is also 
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the possibility of a political shift resulting not only in more inward- 
looking economic policies but in the loss of U.S. military bases in the 
country. Indonesia is another country where there are strong political 
interests favoring import-substitution rather than export-promotion 
policies, Unlike the ADCs, resource-rich countries like Indonesia and 
the Philippines are not forced to promote exports of manufactures in 
order to produce a politically acceptable growth rate. Thailand and 
Malaysia are not only rich in resources but have adopted policies to 
utilize their abundant supplies of unskilled labor in producing manu- 
factured goods for the export trade. They should continue to do well, 
but like the other countries must be pressured to open their own mar- 
kets to a greater extent. 
While this paper has been mainly concerned with the export oppor- 
tunities of the United States and others in the APR market, data has 
also been collected on the performance of the APR countries in world 
export market. The picture that emerges is a familiar one. The devel- 
oping countries of the APR have sent an increasing share of their 
exports to the United States, in many cases a significantly larger share. 
In 1984, U.S. trade with the RRCs was roughly in balance, but the 
United States bought $6 billion of goods from the ADCs than those 
countries purchased from the United States. The shares of exports sent 
to Japan by the APR countries have generally declined or, in a few 
cases, remained about the same. For the EC the share changes are 
mixed-some rising, some staying the same, and others declining. 
Textiles and apparel are the most important category of imports from 
the ADCs and China, but products requiring higher skills, in particular, 
electrical machinery and electronic products, are becoming more sig- 
nificant. For the RRCs, oil and gas dominated their pattern of exports 
to the United States, but in recent years electrical and electronic prod- 
ucts have challenged these products as the most important export cat- 
egory. Clearly, the APR countries are increasing the degree of com- 
plexity of their export product mix. 
The 1980 volume of direct investment by the United States was 
greater in the ADCs than was Japan’s, but Japanese direct investment 
in the entire region was greater than that by the United States. The 
United States is, however, increasingly enlarging its share of its total 
investment in the region, though this share is still quite small. It grew 
from 3.6 percent in 1977 to 6.7 percent in 1984. Oil and service activities, 
such as banking and trade, are the sectors in which direct investment 
in the APR countries takes the largest share of world investment in an 
industry. Services and manufacturing are the sectors in which invest- 
ment in the developing countries of the Asian Pacific rim is growing 
most rapidly. 
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Notes 
1. In this paper, APR will refer only to the developed countries of the Asian 
Pacific rim; Japan is not included. 
2. The high proportion of primary product exports for Singapore reflects the 
large imports of crude petroleum and reexports of refined petroleum products. 
3. Hong Kong’s rate of population increase is relatively high because of 
immigration. 
4. The account of Hong Kong’s trade and development policies is based on 
Lin and Mok 1985; Chen 1984; Lin and Ho 1981; and Cooper 1986. 
5. The account of Singapore’s trade and development policies is based on 
Yue 1980 and 1986; Wong 1981; Roberts 1985; and Cooper 1986. 
6. The account of Korea’s trade and development policies is based on Frank 
1975; Nam 1981; Hong 1977; Balassa 1986; and Cooper 1986. 
7. The account of Taiwan’s trade and development policies is based on Liang 
and Liang 1981; Kuo and Fei 1986; Ranis and Schive 1986; Balassa 1981; and 
Cooper 1986. 
8. The account of the Philippines’ trade and development policies is based 
on Bautista 1980; Baldwin 1975; Alburo and Shepherd 1986; and Niksch 1986. 
9. Philippines export data for 1984 are not yet on the UNCTAD trade data 
tape. 
10. The account of Malaysia’s trade and development policies is based on 
Ariff 1980; Lim 1984; and Niksch 1986. 
11. There are no export figures yet on the UNCTAD trade data tape for 1984. 
12. The account of Thailand’s trade and development policies is based on 
Akrasanee 1977 and 1980; World Bank 1980; Adjanant 1984; and Niksch 1986. 
13. The account of Indonesia’s trade and development policies is based on 
Rosendale 1977; Anwar 1980; World Bank 1981; and Pitt 1985. 
14. The account of China’s trade and development policies is based on Hardt 
and Boone 1986, and Ahearn 1986. 
15. In interpreting the percentages in the table, note that the 1980 and 1984 
figures do not include trade data on Taiwan. 
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2. Robert S .  Ingersoll 
East Asia and the U.S. Economy 
In 1974 when I served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian 
and Pacific affairs, Henry Kissinger, recently installed as secretary of 
state, directed our bureau to draft a policy statement for our region. 
All of us realized immediately that this would be difficult because the 
countries we covered were so diverse. In our region there was no 
straightforward Communisthon-Communist rivalry, no cohesive struc- 
ture like the EEC, no major isue that wove its way through all the 
nations of the region. 
East Asia is still very diverse. Today, Japan is a world economic 
power and a power unto itself in the region. China, along with several 
other nations of the region, is still economically backward. The so- 
called newly industrializing countries-Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singa- 
pore, South Korea-have exhibited some of the fastest growth rates 
in the world. While China manages its economy through central plan- 
ning, Japan employs market competition and government-business co- 
operation. Hong Kong’s approach is almost laissez-faire. 
Today, when I consider our economic relations with this diverse set 
of countries, I feel compelled to start not with a description of East 
Asia, but with a statement of the policy needs of the United States. 
First, year after year we have been suffering huge, utterly unacceptable 
trade deficits. Last year our overall deficit amounted to an unprece- 
dented $170 billion, and 57 percent of that was with East Asia. This is 
a problem we have to solve, and the nations that are part of the problem 
are inevitably going to be affected. We want them to contribute to the 
solution. 
142 Robert E. BaldwidRobert S. Ingersoll/Woo-choong Kim 
Second, we are a major industrial power in an age of technological 
diffusion. Nations throughout the world are absorbing industrial know- 
how, and they are innovating. As a natural result, some of our industries 
are simply no longer competitive, and our economy is going through 
a wrenching adjustment. East Asia is a major cause for this adjustment. 
It is a source of products we love to buy, but at the same time it is a 
focus of resentment, especially among Americans whose jobs have 
moved to the region. 
Deficits and resentment both lend themselves to protectionism, but 
this supposed remedy would only delay the inevitable for our uncom- 
petitive industries and needlessly burden our competitive ones. Our 
economic policy in East Asia should be to support the multilateral 
framework of GATT and encourage the countries of the region to open 
their markets wide to foreign goods and foreign investment. We will 
not achieve our objectives without judicious pressure, and the United 
States-the chief market for these countries-will have to make clear 
that the alternative to GATT is a regime of ad hoc agreements on less 
than desirable terms. 
Definition and Description of the Region 
I view East Asia from a perspective acquired at the State Depart- 
ment, where East Asia and the Pacific are seen as one region. When 
I speak of East Asia or cite statistics for East Asia, I include, in addition 
to the nations already mentioned, Australia, Burma, Indonesia, Ma- 
laysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the islands of the 
Pacific. I exclude the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, 
Outer Mongolia, and Vietnam-nations whose political and economic 
relations with the United States are severely circumscribed. Let me 
take a moment to describe the main features of the region. 
Altogether, East Asia comprises about one-third of the world’s pop- 
ulation, compared to the 5 percent share of the United States. Total 
output of the region is around 13 percent to 15 percent of world GNP, 
compared to the roughly 23 percent to 25 percent share of the United 
States. 
Japan has by far the largest economy in East Asia. With only one- 
thirteenth of the region’s population, it produces an overwhelming 70 
percent of the region’s output. China, with two-thirds of East Asia’s 
population, produces only 9 percent of the region’s output. This never- 
theless makes China the second largest economy in the region. Aus- 
tralia ranks third, South Korea Fourth, Indonesia fifth, and Taiwan 
sixth. 
In terms of per capita income, Japan leads the major nations of the 
region at about $16,000 per year, according to data for 1986 (table 2.36). 
That figure was fairly close to U.S. per capita income of over $17,000 
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Table 2.36 Population, Gross National Product, and Per Capita Income of 
East Asia, 1986 
Per Capita 
Population GNP/GDP GNP/GDP 
(000) (billion US$) (US$) 
Australia 
Burma 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
East Asia 
Asian NICs 
USA 
15,900 
39,300 
1,056,000 
5,500 
166,700 
121,500 
4 1,600 
16,000 
3,300 
55,700 
2,590 
19,400 
52,300 
1,595,790 
69,090 
24 1,900 
164 
9 
252 
37 
78 
1,960 
94 
26 
31 
30 
18 
73 
41 
2,813 
222 
4,207 
-
10,275 
220 
239 
6,740 
468 
16,150 
2,371 
1,620 
9,300 
500 
7,025 
3,748 
785 
1,762 
3,213 
17,390 
Source: U.S. Department of State. 
Nore: Asia’s newly industrializing countries (NICs) are Hong Kong, South Korea, Sin- 
gapore, and Taiwan. 
last year. Down the scale in East Asia is Australia, at about $10,000 
per year. Thereafter comes New Zealand at about $9,000 and Singapore 
and Hong Kong, both around $7,000 per year. Far lower are Burma, 
with per capita income of about $220 per year, and China, at about 
$240 per year. Not surprisingly, many of the poorest countries are those 
in which the labor force is engaged primarily in agriculture. 
East Asia has been the scene of some of the most remarkable stories 
in the history of economic development. Postwar Japan grew at breath- 
taking rates until the 1970s, and it has continued to grow impressively, 
despite oil shocks and its now advanced stage of development. Today 
Japan builds on a tremendous base. Its 4 percent average growth rate 
in the 1980s is more than the equivalent of adding a new Taiwan to the 
world’s economy each year. 
The newly industrializing countries, or NICs, began registering high 
rates of growth in the early 1970s, and generally they have continued 
to grow even in the difficult world economy of the 1980s. Recently, 
however, Singapore and Hong Kong have slowed considerably, al- 
though Taiwan and South Korea continue to move ahead. 
The less developed countries of the region have grown fairly im- 
pressively since the early 1970s-6 percent to 7 percent annually in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, for example. But in the last two 
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years, growth has slowed in most less developed countries, even reg- 
istering zero or negative in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the troubled Phil- 
ippines. GNP is still rising in China, however. 
Exports have been a driving force behind much of the pace-setting 
growth in East Asia. As a consequence, the economies that have grown 
fastest are now highly dependent on exports, particularly exports to 
the United States (table 2.37). Taiwan, for example, exports over one- 
half of GNP, of which 53 percent goes to the United States. South 
Korea exports over one-third of GNP, of which 40 percent goes to the 
United States. Japan, having a more developed domestic economy, 
exports about one-tenth of GNP, of which 42 percent goes to the United 
States. Thus, the NICs and Japan depend heavily on exports, and they 
also depend heavily on the continued openness of the U.S. market. 
This means that we have considerable bargaining power in our relations 
with them. 
Investment Issues 
What problems does the United States face in its economic relations 
with this diverse and dynamic region? For the most part, frictions in 
our relations with East Asia can be divided into investment problems 
and trade problems. Where investment is concerned, Japan and the 
United States are by far the two dominant players in the region. U.S. 
direct investment in East Asia is $33 billion, which constitutes 14 per- 
cent of all U.S. investment abroad (table 2.38). 
Of the $33 billion that the United States has invested in East Asia, 
only $9 billion is invested in Japan (table 2.39). This is a very low level, 
Table 2.37 Export Dependence of East Asian Nations, 1986 
Exports 
as Percent 
of GNP 
U.S. Share 
of Total 
Exports 
Australia 
Burma 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
13.6% 
5.4 
11.1 
85.6 
16.9 
10.5 
36.0 
55.1 
19.0 
16.2 
122.5 
54.9 
21.3 
12.9% 
3.3 
18.6 
29.6 
27.8 
41.5 
39.8 
17.8 
18.9 
44.8 
21.9 
53.4 
21.4 
Source: Calculated from U.S. State Department data. 
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Table 2.38 Composition of U.S. Direct Investment in East Asia, 1985 
$ Millions % Share 
Petroleum 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale trade 
Banking 
Finance, insurance, real estate 
Services 
Other industries 
Total 
(excluding banking) 
9,993a 
11,102 
4,632 
1 ,752a 
2,375 
1,824 
32,616 
565a 
30.6 
34.0 
14.2 
5.4 
7.3 
1.7 
5.6 
Source: Calculated from Survey of Current Business, August 1986, table 15, p. 49. 
aFigure is at least this amount. Disclosure limitations for individual countries prevent 
publication of exact amount. 
given the size of the Japanese economy. In fact, the level of all foreign 
investment in Japan-U.S. and otherwise-is very low compared to 
the levels in other advanced nations of the world. This situation is a 
legacy of the strict laws against foreign investment that Japan main- 
tained during much of the postwar period. These laws have been re- 
scinded, but the government still retains broad administrative powers 
to reject investments that might endanger national security, damage 
existing Japanese businesses, or adversely affect the government’s abil- 
ity to guide the national economy. 
Table 2.39 Composition of U.S. Direct Investment in Japan, 1985 
$ Millions % Share 
Petroleum 2,178 23.9 
Food and kindred products 127 1.4 
Chemicals 1,244 13.7 
Primary and fab. metals 50 0.5 
Nonelectrical machinery 1,620 17.8 
Transportation equipment 578 6.4 
Wholesale trade 1,442 15.9 
Banking 177 1.9 
Finance, insurance, real 
estate (excluding banking) 519 5.7 
Services 74 0.8 
Other industries 83 0.9 
Manufacturing 4,621 49.7 
Electrical equipment 337 3.7 
Other manufacturing 665 7.3 
Total 9,095 
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1986, table 15, p. 49. 
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This means that many potential investors still face regulation. Usu- 
ally this regulation follows the standard Japanese practice of private 
consultation between Japanese officials and Japanese companies in the 
potential investor’s industry, often with the intention of maintaining 
“orderly markets” and preventing “excessive competition.” While en- 
trants to expanding markets may face few difficulties, entrants to ma- 
ture or declining markets are likely to deal with Japanese officials who 
are under great pressure to obstruct the investment. 
South Korea, perhaps following Japan’s example, has maintained 
tight control over foreign investment. In recent years it has instituted 
new, more liberal guidelines, but the power of entrenched special in- 
terests is strong and the attitudes of many Koreans remain autarkic. 
The People’s Republic of China partially opened to foreign investment 
in 1979, but procedures there are bureaucratic, foreign exchange is 
difficult to obtain, and control over local personnel is often limited. 
Potential investors face similar difficulties in many other countries of 
East Asia. 
U.S. policymakers should recognize that fears of foreign economic 
domination on the part of the less developed nations of East Asia are 
legitimate, but at the same time they should strive to convince these 
nations to open their economies to the technology, jobs, and managerial 
skills that flow from foreign investment. 
From Japan and the NICs, on the other hand, we should accept no 
excuses for restricting foreign investment. Japan is itself the world’s 
greatest net holder of assets abroad. Apart from only the clearest rea- 
sons of national defense, Japan has no grounds for hindering foreign 
investment. And the NICs have advanced well beyond the point where 
they can justify restricting investment by claiming the vulnerability of 
a less developed economy. 
Trade Issues 
Greater freedom of investment is vital, but clearly the biggest issue 
in our relations with East Asia is trade. Last year we sold goods worth 
$59 billion to the region and purchased goods worth $155 billion from 
the region. We exported industrial machinery, high-technology goods 
such as aircraft and computers, and agricultural products and processed 
resource-based commodities such as aluminum and lumber. We im- 
ported a wide array of consumer goods and industrial products. 
The United States’ number one trading partner in the region is Japan. 
Last year the total value of United States-Japan trade-that is, the 
value of exports plus imports-was $ 1  12 billion. This constituted over 
half of total U.S. trade with the region. United States-Taiwan trade 
ranked second at $26 billion or 12 percent of total United States-East 
Asia trade. The volume of our Taiwan trade was over three times the 
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volume of our trade with the People’s Republic of China, despite the 
expansion of United States-China trade in recent years. 
United States-East Asia trade is complementary-each party im- 
proves its welfare by importing goods that can be produced more cheaply 
abroad than at home. However, the net flow of goods has grown tre- 
mendously out of balance (fig. 2.1). In 1970 the U.S. deficit with the 
region was slightly less than $2 billion. In 1980 it was $18 billion. In 
1985 it was $80 billion, and last year it reached $96 billion. With only 
two nations of the region-Australia and BruneiAid the United States 
run surpluses last year. Fifty-nine billion dollars of our trade deficit 
was with Japan, which sold over three times more goods to the United 
States than it bought from the United States. Sixteen billion dollars of 
our deficit was with Taiwan, which sold over four times more goods 
to the United States than it bought from the United States. 
The United States’ trade deficit with East Asia is clearly a problem 
of major proportions, and it should be acknowledged at the outset that 
U.S. economic policy is partly to blame. The need to fund staggering 
budget deficits has propped up dollar interest rates and consequently 
the dollar itself. An overvalued dollar has made imports attractive and 
has hampered the ability of U.S. industry to export. This has caused 
the United States to run record-high deficits with almost all of its trading 
partners, not just with East Asian countries (table 2.40). 
Recently the value of the dollar has gone through a year-long fall, 
and the latest trade data suggest that the trade deficit may finally be 
declining. However, changing exchange rates will not eradicate the 
Millions US$ 
50 
I I I 1  
1 975 1980 1985 ‘86 
Fig. 2.1 U.S. Trade balance with East Asia and the world, 1970-86. 
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Table 2.40 U.S. Trade Balance with East Asia, 1986 
U.S. Surplus 
(deficit) 
(millions US$) 
Percentage 
of Total 
U.S. Deficit 
Australia 
Brunei 
Burma 
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
East Asia 
Asian NICs 
Western Europe 
Latin America 
World 
2,380 
137 
(2) 
(2,135) 
(6,444) 
(2,757) 
(58,837) 
(7,588) 
(807) 
(805) 
(1,519) 
(16,069) 
(1,018) 
(96,022) 
(31,619) 
(33,583) 
(13,227) 
(169,777) 
(224) 
- 
0.0 
1.3 
3.8 
1.6 
34.7 
4.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.5 
0.9 
9.5 
0.6 
56.6 
18.6 
19.8 
7.8 
- 
Source: U.S. Department of State. 
Note: Asia’s newly industrializing countries (NICs) are Hong Kong, South Korea, Sin- 
gapore, and Taiwan. 
deficit-at least not soon. While the dollar has fallen about 40 percent 
against the Japanese yen over the past year, it has dropped less dra- 
matically against the currencies of many other trading partners, par- 
ticularly other East Asian trading partners (table 2.41). Even more 
important, a major component of the deficit problem is restrictions on 
the access of U.S. goods to many East Asian markets, and this situation 
is changing slowly. 
Japan, for example, is a notoriously hard market for U.S. companies 
to crack. Although tariffs are low, domestic competition is keen, lan- 
guage is a nettlesome obstacle, and not least of all, many Japanese 
businessmen prefer the certainty of dealing with other Japanese to the 
uncertainty of dealing with foreigners. Japan should not be faulted for 
these barriers. They are facts of economic life in Japan, and our com- 
panies simply must work to overcome them. 
However, there are barriers for which Japan should be faulted. For 
example, the Japanese government targets industries for growth. These 
industries receive, in addition to subsidies, a veil of official and un- 
official protection against threatening foreign competition. This can 
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Table 2.41 Japanese Yen/U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Yearly Average, 
1970-86 
Year Rate 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
358.15 
348.03 
303.11 
271.31 
291.90 
296.75 
296.48 
268.37 
210.40 
219.18 
226.53 
220.41 
249.05 
237.45 
237.58 
238.47 
168.50 
lead to unending frustration for foreign companies that try to sell to 
Japan, even when they enjoy clear competitive advantages. 
Barriers in Japan were once overt, legal, systematic, and pervasive. 
This is no longer the case. However, the protectionist orientation of 
the nation’s early postwar period lives on in the minds of the business 
and governmental bureaucrats who administer, regulate, and purchase 
in Japan today. Certainly, Japan has carried out an extensive program 
of trade liberalization, and for this it deserves credit, In fact, Americans 
have probably been slow to grasp the changes. Clearly, our companies 
have not taken full advantage of the new access to Japanese markets. 
Nevertheless, Japan is still not as open as it ought to be, especially in 
view of the benefits it derives from the free trade policies of other 
nations. 
What is most unfortunate about this situation, though, is that Japan 
is a model for other East Asian nations. Its constant reluctance to 
liberalize-indeed, almost never to concede except under pressure- 
is not going unobserved by other nations in the region. Perhaps with 
Japan in mind, perhaps not, these other nations are collaborating with 
local businesses to nurture infant industries until they are strong enough 
to compete on world markets. Sometimes this policy works. Sometimes 
it does not. When it does work, the result is trade friction. When it 
does not, the protectionist nation ends up, first, denying itself the 
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benefits of foreign investment and second, creating hothouse industries 
that can survive only through protection and subsidy. 
This is especially true for the smaller nations of the region. Their 
domestic markets are not big enough to do what Japan has done, that 
is, grow domestic industries to a scale sufficient to compete in inter- 
national markets. When they try and fail, the result is misallocation of 
resources and harm to the national welfare. 
Structural Adjustment 
Trade is a tremendous problem in East Asia, but to properly under- 
stand it we should view it in the context of history. For a brief period 
after World War 11, devastation in Europe and Asia gave the United 
States world superiority in industrial technology. So decided was this 
dominance that we produced more than 60 percent of the world’s man- 
ufactures in the late 1940s. The revival of the industrial economies of 
Europe and Japan has eroded our share of world manufactures and 
exports. 
Today we are witnessing the extension of industrial technology be- 
yond Europe and Japan to regions of the world that were not indus- 
tralized prior to World War 11. In East Asia, the NICs are assimilating 
industrial technology at a ravenous pace. Eventually China will follow 
the same path, though it is still very far behind, building on a relatively 
small economic and educational base. As industrial technology contin- 
ues to diffuse, East Asian economies will continue to shift the scales 
of comparative advantage in the world. 
This will cause major changes in the United States. Heretofore, the 
United States has, both before and after its temporary postwar dom- 
inance, exported goods that are long on engineering and short on un- 
skilled labor. We have imported goods that are short on eingineering 
and long on unskilled labor. The traditional sources of our comparative 
advantage have been our high level of technical education and our 
experience organizing for production. These are now being challenged 
by the nations of East Asia. 
This need not harm us. Some of our industries will move offshore, 
but some will stay here and prosper. The real challenge to us is the 
challenge of adjustment. If we protect our industries, we will do no 
more than create uncompetitive subsidy-sustained cripples that will 
siphon resources from true job-creating enterprises. Instead we must 
retrain the workers in our uncompetitive industries. This is not a simple 
task, because education in the United States has fallen to the point 
where many of our workers today are not able to read, write, and 
calculate well enough to make retraining practical. 
We must, of course, make every effort to increase our access to East 
Asian markets, whenever justified, so that our industries that are world 
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competitive can achieve their full potential. Greater access to East 
Asian markets would also deflect U.S. domestic political pressure for 
protectionism. It is vital that we gain the access we deserve, and we 
should use our leverage with export-dependent NICs and Japan to 
ensure that we get it. 
Conclusion: GATT or a Less Desirable Alternative 
How do we translate this into policy? First, we should be careful 
not to throw our weight around until we have put our own house in 
order. We should cut our huge budget deficit and establish meaningful 
programs to retrain displaced workers. Also, we have to work harder 
to export to East Asia, rather than rely on our own domestic market 
as we have so much in the past. Once we have embarked on these 
tasks, however, we should carry out an active East Asian economic 
policy based on the premise that free trade under GATT is best for all 
nations of the region. This approach, with due safeguards for the eco- 
nomic independence of the less developed nations, clearly provides 
the best framework for balanced, equitable economic growth within 
the region. 
However, not all nations will perceive their interests in this fashion. 
Some for reasons of ideology, others due to excessive nationalism, and 
still others because they misinterpret Japan’s economic development 
will attempt to gain the benefits of GATT without meeting its obliga- 
tions. For these nations a carrot and stick are called for. We should 
offer them a choice between GATT and tough bilateral agreements that 
restrict their exports to the United States, if necessary. The so-called 
voluntary restraint agreements are an example. 
These are not tools we should want to use. They are protectionist 
measures, and they violate the multilateral spirit of GATT. When we 
use them we should recognize that we are courting the danger that 
they will cause world trade to degenerate into a melange of minor 
trading systems, each protectionist vis-a-vis the others. But this is a 
risk we must take when other nations follow policies that hinder the 
ability of our own industries to do what they do best. 
This sounds threatening, perhaps, but it is based on the positive 
premise that free trade serves us better than protectionism. We know 
that tremendous structural adjustments are on the horizon for American 
industry. If we forget about protecting dying industries and instead 
devote ourselves to educating and retraining our people, we will con- 
tinue to maintain our sources of comparative advantage. Then our own 
standard of living will increase along with the standard of living of the 
peoples of East Asia, as they and we increase our productivity. 
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3. Woo-choong Kim 
The Era of Pacific Coprosperity 
Many people think of Asia when the word Pacific is mentioned, but 
the Pacific is actually a huge area that includes North, Central, and 
South America, and Oceania, as well as the Far East and Southeast 
Asia. 
This vast area includes nations highly divergent in history, culture, 
language, and stages of economic development, so it is easier to pin- 
point differences rather than similarities among these many nations. 
Consequently, I focus on those nations where political, cultural, and 
economic considerations are closely interrelated, and where Western 
and Oriental civilizations come together, namely, the United States, 
Korea, Japan, and China. 
Recent Changes in the Pacific Theater 
The world has focused greater attention in recent years on the Pacific 
Theater. In recent decades, nations in the Pacific Theater have shown 
the largest and most consistent growth in trade volume and GNP in 
the world, accompanied by correspondingly rapid changes in their eco- 
nomic and social structures. These nations have quickly emerged as 
new markets and new competitors in the international economy. 
This area of the world has most dramatically demonstrated the su- 
periority of capitalism over communism, an ideology that had been 
dazzling many people in the region for a long time. In recent months, 
even the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc nations, and China have been 
paying greater attention to the benefits of the capitalist system. In 
particular, the Asian NICs, by taking resolute steps for increased trade 
and the international division of labor, have aptly demonstrated the 
importance of free trade in promoting economic welfare and political 
stability. 
For a variety of reasons, American interest in the Asian Pacific has 
developed rapidly in recent years. But we can look to World War I1 
for the seeds of this interest. The role of the United States in the Pacific 
during the war was obvious, but it was in the postwar period that 
America had the opportunity to spread the development of democratic 
and capitalistic ideologies to highly different cultures and distant re- 
gions. Through national defense and foreign aid programs, the United 
States began to exert increased influence, while at the same time de- 
veloping more interest in the Pacific at home. 
As ties increased, so did trade. One result has been that the trade 
volume with the Pacific totaled $1  16.5 billion in 1985, some $20 billion 
larger than total American trade with the Atlantic for that year. 
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With the birth of a new international economic order influenced by 
the Asian Pacific, the United States has been required to make impor- 
tant changes in its trade and industrial structures. This has focused 
greater attention on the western Pacific as well. Competition by these 
nations with the United States on the global market has vastly increased. 
Japan’s targeting-industry strategy has been highly effective. And 
the NICs, mainly in the Asian Pacific, mass-produce and export low- 
cost, reasonable-quality products to world markets. This is made pos- 
sible through their relatively low labor costs and use of newer equip- 
ment and improved medium-level technology. As a result, the American 
industrial structure is changing rapidly. 
Also, we observe the gradual migration of population and industry 
from the northeastern United States to the South and West. As a result, 
the United States is looking increasingly more to neighbors to its west. 
Consequently, we see an increasing number of Americans with a more 
accurate understanding of Oriental society. 
Rapid progress in shipping, transportation, and communications has 
led to tremendous increases in both material and human movement in 
the Pacific region. Also, the presence of American troops in many 
nations and the influx of large numbers of Asian students, military 
personnel, and civilians to the United States have resulted in adaptation 
of Western concepts and models of managerial strategies, the spread 
of Western production technology, and the promotion of cultural 
exchange. 
One major result has been the rapid development of a production 
basis for multinational companies. This, in turn, has resulted in the 
proliferation of reasonably priced, quality industrial products for both 
domestic and world markets. But at the same time, a number of im- 
portant questions have arisen concerning managerial strategies for such 
multinational companies. 
For example, each of these big companies, competing with fewer 
domestic firms, has to develop strategies to become the lowest-cost 
producer in the international market. Or the companies are forced to 
induce flexible manufacturing systems which are, at this stage, rather 
unstable in the ever-changing international economic climate. And there 
is the important question of sharing profit margins between the home 
office and overseas operations. Furthermore, in addition to adapting 
to each host nation’s policies and regulations, such firms must develop 
a total global strategy to encompass production, finance, personnel, 
and other facts of international operations. All of this becomes ex- 
ceedingly complex. 
Rapid technological development has also arisen as a major concern 
for all. Until recent decades, technological development has largely 
been centered in the United States and Europe. But Japan and the 
NICs have been rapidly expanding their technological development 
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capabilities, and the technological gap with the United States continues 
to narrow. This means even greater and more diverse international 
competition in the years ahead. But the full impact of the importance 
of this issue is not yet clear. 
With increased world and American attention on the Pacific, we are 
seeing greatly activated study on comparative culture. These efforts 
are aimed at defining the best that both East and West have to offer in 
terms of social and cultural development. 
Considerable interest is now being shown in the merging of cultural 
differences. Western experts are showing marked interest in traditional 
Asian culture for the social and moral cohesion it provides. In the 
Pacific and particularly in East Asia we are seeing successful industrial 
development based on the gradual amalgamation and digestion of tra- 
ditional Asian thought with Western concepts of practicality and in- 
dividualism. Until now, much of Asia has been preoccupied with ideal- 
istic value and suppression of individualism for. the common good 
through organizational control. 
In contrast, Western industrialized society is based largely on con- 
tract, law, and the quest for individual profits. But with increased eco- 
nomic and cultural cooperation, the time has come for the West to 
realize the importance of restraint on short-term individual interest for 
the common good as found in Asian mentality. Acceptance of this 
notion should result in a strategic design that should affect not only 
short-term effectiveness in managing organizations, but also long-term 
motivations for improving interrelationships among different interest 
groups with different experiences or cultures. 
The contrasts between East and West are interesting enough, but the 
merger of these two distinct approaches to life is proving to be even 
more so. 
The Future of the Pacific Theater 
It is safe to say that the Pacific region will continue with rapid eco- 
nomic growth, and we will see continued growth in terms of quality as 
well as quantity. Growth of the past, based mostly on extended trade, 
will become supplemented by increased technological improvements 
and advances. The nations mentioned should be increasing their role 
in becoming main suppliers of technology to the world in years to come. 
At the same time, their economic prosperity, good work ethics, and 
habitual frugality should bring continued increases in domestic savings, 
which in turn will make these nations future suppliers of capital to the 
rest of the world. 
We can also expect a continued rise in the prominence of multina- 
tional conglomerates. They will become more realistic in adapting to 
ever-changing situations and more efficient in setting up global strat- 
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egies, through increased experience and through harmonizing Eastern 
and Western cultures. This will, of course, result in expanded economic 
development as well. 
Politically, through weakening support for the Communist system, 
we will see greatly reduced tensions between East and West, with the 
previous “ideological war” being replaced by detente and “ideological 
amalgamation.” The Pacific region will also serve as evidence that 
democracy is possible even in Oriental countries, where no great re- 
spect for democracy has existed in their long history. 
We can find many reasons to be optimistic about continued economic 
development for the Pacific Theater. One is the prospect for future 
markets. A full two-thirds of the world’s population is in Asia, and 
much of this market is yet to be tapped. 
Additionally, we can be optimistic about resources. China, ASEAN 
countries, the United States, and Australia have huge deposits of un- 
tapped natural resources which can be put to use over an extended 
period of time. They have human resources as well: There is plenty of 
manpower. People work hard, and there are relatively high levels of 
education in many nations in the region. And as China and India become 
more liberalized and open, we can expect increased practicalism and 
better utilization of both natural and human resources in the region. 
Economic barriers to trade are also expected to lessen. This will be 
attributed to continued technological developments in shipping, trans- 
portation, and communications, wider use of information systems, and 
general trends toward international cooperation on all levels. 
The current rigorous exchange of culture is developing a worldwide 
sympathy never experienced before. International understanding, as a 
result, should promote such a global consciousness even further and 
restrain unnecessary international frictions. However, a favorable en- 
vironment cannot be the only factor in determining the future. A more 
important factor would be who will do what, and how. 
We have seen history being made by people, especially by leaders 
of each era. Consequently, to see into and understand the future of the 
Pacific Theater, we should look to projected leading nations and ask 
about their approach to solving the problems before us. 
Expected American Responses to the Pacific Era 
Considering all regional aspects, we expect both the United States 
and Japan to maintain their positions as leaders in the region, sort of 
the locomotives pulling the train; the other nations will follow as man- 
ufacturers and suppliers to the world market. This is the reality. There- 
fore, it is useful for us to speculate on what would be the American 
response to the emerging Pacific era. Some of these responses and 
strategies may contribute considerably to further promotion of Pacific 
coprosperity, while others may be harmful even to America itself. 
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On the bright side, many Americans are proud that the United States 
is the international leader in all aspects and believe in her ability to 
accommodate to ever-changing situations and to compete with any 
nation in the world. I personally agree with this view. And I am happy 
to see that Americans have already started to heighten international 
competitiveness through greater fusion of economic and social issues. 
These movements of curing social incompetence include attempts to 
reduce the drug problem and to increase sociopsychological education 
for workers, to improve productivity at various levels, and to revitalize 
entrepreneurial culture and technical manpower-pursuing advanced 
technologies. 
On the other hand, for political reasons, we may see increasing 
American protectionism, which had been the exclusive right of less 
developed countries. Current sectional or regional interests may easily 
become too influential on a national level. We may see American con- 
sumers begin to outspend themselves. And the extreme convergence 
of brains upon such careers as lawyer and investment banker may result 
in even lower productivity in the manufacturing industry in general. 
America is now faced with some difficult economic situations. These 
situations may easily induce ordinary people to seek easy, short-term 
solutions rather than difficult, long-term, yet highly effective solutions 
for lasting prosperity. These situations are not unlike those that other 
nations are facing. 
New Attitude for a New Era 
Neither protectionism nor currency depreciation can be a valid recipe 
for this situation. No one will benefit from these measures. Only pro- 
ductivity increase itself can serve as a means of solving current and 
future problems intrinsically. 
To promote this new era of coprosperity in the Pacific, all nations 
involved must develop new attitudes that will drive out the temptation 
for short-term and one-sided profits and that could bring long-term, 
mutual benefit for international society. In this sense, I ask you to 
reconfirm the belief in free trade. The new round of GATT talks is a 
necessary and urgent step in this direction. 
Second, by restricting such movements as isolationism or new na- 
tionalism, we minimize the risk of making political issues of economic 
problems. 
In the arena of international trade, some Americans have often as- 
serted that the uncompetitiveness of American goods is due mainly to 
“unfair” trade practice by Japan and the NICs. We often hear about 
“manipulated” or “assaulting” industrial policies and “unfairly man- 
aged” exchange rate systems of other governments. But those people 
may not clearly perceive the total picture. In Japan and other NICs, 
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people really work hard. They save as much as possible. They study 
foreign markets as much as their own domestic markets. Americans 
should be aware that the leaders and people of recently prospering 
countries have been ready to sacrifice their own short-term interest for 
their common good and better competitiveness. American pioneers did 
the same things, with the spirit of challenge, when they built this great 
society. The present situation may be different from the past in some 
ways, but the solution seems to be the same. 
Also, fairness in all aspects of international cooperation must be 
stressed. For being fair in the long run, leader nations should bestow 
short-term favors to follower nations for their own, as well as for 
everyone’s, long-term interests. History tells us that, in a solid society, 
leaders are willing to sacrifice their own interests for the long-term 
prosperity of the whole of society. Ultimately, followers are expected 
to accomplish their roles by learning from leaders. 
Pacific Economic Community: An Example 
I know this is not the time for vague ideas and soft rhetoric. It is the 
time to implement idealistic values with practical, concrete programs 
without further delay. Therefore, I propose a kind of “Pacific economic 
community” to create reliable and fruitful ways for the everlasting 
expansion of trade and coprosperity within the region. 
Too many economic theories tell us the advantages of the free trade 
system, which we can never give up. But history tells us that no nation 
seeks a free trade policy without confidence in its ability to compete, 
without heartful needs for complementarity, and without deep trust in 
its trading partners. To satisfy these conditions we should have a syn- 
thetic agreement covering the forward directions each country should 
go into and the time schedule every government must keep in mind. 
Let me give an example. 
Because we are aware that trade cannot be a zero-sum game, we 
need to prepare not ceaseless piecemeal negotiations but an omnibus 
plan that provides us with the steps to correct in a short time the ill- 
balanced balance of payment problems. 
To resolve current problems with some nations’ balance of payments, 
each government involved should draft a list of products that it would 
buy and that it could produce more economically than other nations. 
The products and related industrial policies should be adjusted grad- 
ually and with forward strategy by an intergovernmental committee 
considering balance of payment situations and industrial capabilities of 
each country. This would help make long-term planning by govern- 
ments more reasonable and guide private companies to invest, produce, 
and market with higher confidence in the future international business 
environment. 
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At the same time, a new principle on a new international division of 
labor would have to be established; this would prevent any one nation 
from completely monopolizing any one industrial sector. In principle, 
the United States could concentrate on innovative technology, capital 
investment, and venture business, while Japan could make use of com- 
mercialization of technology development and capital investment. Ko- 
rea and China would offer plenty of diligent manpower with acceptable 
levels of education and great willingness to learn from more advanced 
nations. Of course, formation of a research team backed up by every 
government would bring us more concrete programs. 
In promoting further inter-Pacific cooperation, the leader nations 
could provide greater capital and technical support for the development 
of large deposits of natural resources in China and the ASEAN coun- 
tries, while aiming at greater industrial development in these areas. 
The leader nations should keep in mind that an eternally poor nation 
can never be their market and that it is in their own interests to help 
bring nations out of poverty. 
Essential to the success of the new system would be not only the 
willingness of all nations to establish valid systems for the efficient use 
of abundant resources, but also the determination to sacrifice short- 
term, sectional, and unilateral self-interest as well as the wisdom to 
develop more concrete programs to implement politically. 
Since it is hard for any nation to sacrifice its own interests, even if 
they are sectional or regional, there is little chance of developing a 
common-benefit system without great efforts. So the development of 
a Pacific economic community requires decisive political action and 
determination to convince people that such a community would benefit 
all. 
We are confronted with a difficult and historically important assign- 
ment which should be done without failure. The time has come for 
ideas and theories on such an economic community to be implemented 
for true coprosperity. Wishful thinking and vague ideas never build a 
better tomorrow. We all have a moral and historical responsibility to 
forge ahead into that better tomorrow through action and cooperation 
today. 
Summary of Discussion 
Woo-choong Kim noted that Hyundai had sold only about seven cars 
to Japan and remarked that it is difficult to market to Japan, suggesting 
that the Japanese should open their economy more. If they did so, he 
predicted, within five years Korea would have a favorable trade balance 
159 U.S. and Foreign Competition in the APR Developing Countries 
with Japan. Korea will produce parts and import the facilities from the 
United States and Europe. If the Japanese do not use Korean parts, 
they will not be able to compete. 
Kim proposed that many people underestimate American competi- 
tiveness. Most American companies, he thought, have increased their 
competitiveness. He has some doubts, however, about whether Amer- 
ican workers can work hard enough. Another concern is the brain drain 
in the United States into law and investment banking, both of which 
hurt industry. Furthermore, Americans overemphasize high technology 
to the detriment of medium technology. Americans must develop a 
consensus to support the country, not just themselves. Service indus- 
tries are not sufficient in their own right. Financial markets, for ex- 
ample, follow the underlying industrial base; the Japanese are fast 
becoming financial powers because of their underlying strength. 
Korea has succeeded because it has a new generation of leaders who 
graduated from school after independence. The country has a won- 
derful work force of educated, hardworking people. Koreans are ready 
to sacrifice, to work hard as a duty. 
Korea’s exchange rate is not necessarily undervalued. There remains 
$43 billion in debt. Furthermore the country faces the North and has 
to buy defense hardware, as well as satellites and other goods un- 
available at home. 
By 1990 or 1991, American trade will be in balance, Kim continued. 
In any case, Korea is not the problem since it is taking the Japanese 
or European share of the American market. The Japanese price six 
months to one year ahead, so they take time to adapt to the currency 
fall. They will soon start having problems. 
The focus of the discussion shifted to the restrictive trade policies 
of Japan, Korea, and the other newly industralized countries. Robert 
Baldwin pointed out that we cannot attribute the U.S. trade deficit to 
the trade policy of Japan and the NICs because they were always closed 
while the trade deficit is only five years old; instead he emphasized 
macroeconomic factors and the budget deficit. He also argued that a 
nonmarket means of allocating production between countries would be 
politically unfeasible and economically inefficient. 
Baldwin contended that reducing the large amount of protection in 
these countries should nonetheless be pursued. They will open up, he 
predicted, and when they do we will all benefit; recent economic history 
teaches that a liberal trade policy leads to rapid growth. The question 
is how to achieve this openness. Baldwin argued that bilateral pressure, 
a new phenomenon, is quite effective, partly since small countries get 
a free ride in GATT. For this approach to work, retaliation must be a 
possible recourse, and the voluntary export restraint is too much against 
GATT to be the weapon of choice. Rather, Baldwin prefers antidumping 
and countervailing duties as part of well-defined fair trade laws. 
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One participant said that in 1987 Korea was almost 94 percent free 
to imports, and he predicted close to 100 percent opening of the market 
by 1990. Koreans are willing to open to the United States in light of 
its growing trade deficit problems with Korea and other countries, but 
there is general apprehension that a broad opening up of the market 
might end up benefiting only countries like Japan, more so than the 
United States. So the problem is with countries that have no trade 
deficit problems; because they would attack a more open market ag- 
gressively, the Americans and Koreans should arrange for mutually 
profitable trade between themselves. The problem, he contended, is 
that U.S. companies think domestically, while exporting to Asia re- 
quires a more international perspective. Most Korean leaders, for ex- 
ample, have been educated in the United States. 
Saburo Okita agreed with one aspect of the discussion, that inter- 
Asian trade is too small, amounting to something like 15 percent of 
Asian trade, while trade with the United States is 40 percent of the 
total. In Europe, by contrast, intraregional trade is 50 percent of the 
total while trade with the United States is 10 percent. Thus one way 
to reduce pressure on U.S. markets is to open markets to Asians. 
Robert Ingersoll and Woo-choong Kim agreed, but both emphasized 
the need for mutual opening. Ingersoll suggested that the Japanese 
should take some responsibility in this area and should be the first 
Asian country to open up. 
